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ABSTRACT
This research analyzes why diplomacy is failing in the Dominican Republic. In this thesis,
I describe how Dominicans construct their foreign affairs, and the limitations that diplomacy has
had in the country. In order to achieve these goals, I have analyzed official documents such as the
2013 and 2015 payrolls of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and legal documents including Article
146 from the Constitution, Organic Law 314 from 1964, and the Protocol of Transparency and
Institutions. I argue that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic lacks
seriousness and is characterized by the following variables: (1) patronage, (2) corruption, and (3)
the systematic violation of Dominican law. The thesis emphasizes how these variables have had a
tremendous impact on the exercise of diplomacy. The research analyzes the reaction of the
Dominican state and its citizens and how the nation responds to criticisms by the international
community. Dominican citizens think that the opinion of international media is a campaign against
their country. The implications of this false public perception is an intense nationalism, and the
government encourages this. The true problem, as this thesis demonstrates, is institutional
weakness. The government uses intense and widespread nationalism to hide institutional weakness
and state corruption. After exploring this dialogue between the government, citizens and
international media, I move forward framing concepts such as soft power and new public
diplomacy to reinforce the importance of listening to foreign publics. In addition I explain why the
country needs to change the traditional approach to foreign affairs. The adoption of a new public
diplomacy is required to establish credibility and the integration between state, citizens and
international publics.
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CHAPTER I
Changes and Challenges in the Dominican Diplomacy
Introduction
Diplomacy in the Dominican Republic has a lot of challenges. The constant conflict with
Haiti and the accusations by the international community that categorize the nation as a racist
country have force the Dominican Republic to proactively work toward cultivating a more positive
reputation. However, I argue that in order to improve the nations’ international reputation, the
Dominican Republic has to address the internal weaknesses in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This
internal evaluation would help in projecting a better image of the country. After the accusations of
racism, the diplomatic reaction has been to invest money in improving the country’s reputation by
paying for public relations officials to explain the Dominican perspective (Thomas, 2015). The
government, instead of trying to address the problems of patronage, corruption, and the failure to
uphold the laws by the Ministry, looks for an easy solution. I evaluate the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to analyze why diplomacy is failing in the Dominican Republic. First, I discuss what type
of diplomacy Dominicans have been pursing. What has made diplomacy remain retrograde in the
face of global changes? I then analyze the variables of patronage, corruption, and “law and reality”
in the Ministry.
I examine the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to identify the law’s antagonism, specifically in
regards to the role of public officials. One of the main issues in the institution is that officials are
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not working to construct strong public diplomacy in the countries to which they are assigned.
Consequently, the Dominican Republic has a questionable form of diplomacy, which is only
implemented when the country receives international pressure. Former diplomat Bernardo Vega
highlights that there are people who receive a paycheck as foreign consulate officers but who have
never left the Dominican Republic (Reuters, 2014). The lack of seriousness in the exercise of these
officials has damaged the reputation and effectiveness of the Dominican Foreign Service.
Resolving this problem should be one of the first steps in achieving a new framework of
Diplomacy.
There is a danger in believing that the international community is implementing a
misguided campaign to discredit the Dominican Republic in terms of its relations with Haiti.
Rather than focusing first on the Dominican Republic’s relationship with its neighbors, this thesis
focuses on reviewing what the Dominican Republic is doing in terms of public diplomacy. I
hypothesize that the nation’s negative reputation is due to the failure of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Specifically, I argue that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have an effective or
even workable international relations strategy because the diplomatic corps is not actually working
in the countries where they are supposed to be. The local and international press has declared that
the diplomatic corps in the Dominican Republic is an agent of "empty bottles" (Reuters, 2014).
This term is used to describe public officers where the official receives a salary and does not attend
to his or her duties.
This thesis highlights the importance of strong institutions in the development of
diplomacy. I argue that negative international opinion could help Dominican officials to reframe
a new diplomacy. Diplomacy should be viewed as a way to promote economic, political and
cultural activities by the diplomatic corps, but also as a way of presenting the national agenda to
2

the foreign public. Transparency of the national institutions is key to being successful in this kind
of diplomacy.

Importance of Study
In the Dominican Republic the international dynamic has been historically to develop a
defensive diplomacy. Every time that the country is facing a challenge in the international arena,
the executive and a group of Ministers meet to develop a public relations strategy which will appeal
to the foreign public (MIREX, 2015). The country currently faces criticism around the world
because of its racist policy towards people of Haitian descent. The Dominican Republic needs a
different type of diplomatic approach to lead the country in building strategic international
relations. Reforming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could help the country live up to its full
potential.
I argue the necessity of controlling patronage, corruption and the execution of the laws in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This reform is crucial to the consolidation of democracy. Failure
to do so provokes a problem for diplomatic accountability.
This research highlights the importance of the reconstruction of Dominican international
relations through employing soft power and public diplomacy. A solid external politics cannot
exist if clear and feasible internal guidelines are not established. In this sense, the analyzed
variables--patronage, corruption and the violation of Dominican law-- explain the institutional
shortcomings that the country faces.
Patronage
Patronage affects the diplomatic body of the country. The election of officers by political
patronage and cronyism creates a deficit of professionalism in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
situation generates collateral damage to professionals in the field, since the opportunities to
3

exercise the career turn out to be affected by lobbying and political influences. It is important to
expand professionalism in state administration in order to reach strong policy decisions.
The patronage relationship between the government and political elites in state
administration is also a problem that presidential, monarchic, and parliamentary systems all face.
(Farazmand, 1997). The problem caused by patronage is that citizens begin to resent how the
government uses the resources of the state. According to Farazmand, “...growing budget deficits
and higher taxation, have caused major concern regarding the role of government in society in
general and the role of the bureaucracy in particular” (Farazmand, 1997, p. vii). For this reason it
is important to have qualified officials who can respond to the real challenges of the diplomacy,
and, who can achieve accountability.
Corruption
The Dominican Republic, with a population of 10.41 million, has high levels of corruption.
According to Transparency International Dominican Republic has more nepotism than Mexico,
Colombia and Brazil (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2014).
Transparency International defines political corruption as “a manipulation of policies,
institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision
makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth” (Transparency
International, 2016). The payrolls of the institution of Foreign Affairs reflect how state
administrators use their power to recommend families to the diplomatic corps. This action is a
violation of the Dominican constitution and other laws.
Law and Reality
Latin American laws are based in Southern European legal tradition, specifically the Siete
Partidas and the Napoleonic Code. According to Richard M. Morse, law in this context is often
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understood as an ideal, or an utopian notion of how society should behave, rather than what the
society must do. Morse stresses that “the Partidas were not so much rules for conduct in the Roman
sense but rather medieval types of principles of proper conduct and of the well-ordered society and
polity that approached the sanctity and status of being moral treaties.” (Wiarda, 1992, p. 214).
Likewise, Morse emphasizes that the Napoleonic Code was not successful in the region because it
proposed a worldview which was “anti-feudal and highly individualistic, while Latin America
remained essentially a corporate-feudal arena.” (Wiarda, 1992, p. 217). In that sense, the adoption
of ideas from both systems has contributed to an authoritarian and personalistic political culture.
Dominican institutions have a dichotomy between laws and reality; the Dominican state
creates beautiful laws that politicians then violate for their own purposes. Bernd Reiter explains
that laws in Latin American countries are created just to provide a framework for how a society
should act, which is actually very far from how the society is ordered in the present. This type of
state mentality developed from a heritage of colonization and rooted in legal idealism. As Reiter
states, “legal idealism characterizes a system where laws are created and codified by elites, who
take little interest and are indeed unfamiliar with the reality of the majority” (Reiter, 2013, p. 139).

Research Design and Methodology
In this thesis I have measured the variables of patronage, corruption, and the execution of
law in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic between the years 1986-2015. I
first observed the situation of the country in the summer of 2015 when the international media
denounced the nation as racist, and the Dominican government defensively reacted. During this
time, the government contracted public relations agencies to defend the country by implementing
a national strategy to address media claims. This crisis led me to question why the government had
to contract PR agencies when the Dominican Foreign Service is already supposed to fulfill this
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function. I have examined the negative reports about the Domincan Foreign Service by the
Dominican national media between 2013 and 2015. I identify that the headline “Dominican
Republic’s ‘empty bottles’ diplomats under scrutiny,” published by Reuters in May 16 in 2014,
had a powerful influence on Dominican public opinion. The importance of this claim by
international media provoked a local media critique of the Foreign Service. Acento.com.do
composed a series of documents where the media could obtain the 2013 payroll of all who were
paid by the State Department. The article describes how political patronage (clientelism) and
corruption tainted diplomacy. After analyzing this media coverage, I then compare the variable of
corruption with the Corruption Perception Index 2014, by Transparency International and the
United Nations Blue Book, which illustrate the quantity of Dominican diplomats in UN.
The documents published by Acento.com.do contain a list of names, and highlight the
Foreign Service officials identities and how they received their appointments. The 2013 payrolls
contain a list of Reformist Party (PRSC) members. It also contains a list of people recommended
by the senator Felix Bautista, who was accused of corruption in 2012 for illegal construction
contracts in Haiti, and who is one of the most corrupt politicians in the world according to
International Transparency in 2016. Furthermore, I completed my own analysis of the 2015 Payroll
where I discovered some irregularities. I identify a list of positions where the minimum wage is
higher than the amount that officials are “earning”.
I then assessed historical documents in order to understand how the Dominican patronage
system works. I evaluated how the exchange of favors was part of the Dominican transition to
democracy. In order to measure corruption and the disconnect between law and reality, I examined
primary sources such as the Dominican Constitution, the 1964 Organic Law, and two documents
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from the institution “Citizen Participation1” where I evaluate the measurement 7 and 9 concerning
transparency in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
I also interviewed the Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang via email. Sang has written two
books on foreign affairs “The Dominican Foreign Affairs 1844-1961” and “The Dominican
Foreign Affairs 1961-1974,” both books cover a large period of the history of Dominican Foreign
Affairs. Sang’s analysis correlated with the three periods that I identified as the most remarkable
in the diplomatic history of the country: the Trujillo dictatorship, the transition to democracy under
Joaquin Balaguer, and the period of globalization under Leonel Fernández.
I used all this data to assess the current and future state of Dominican Foreign Affairs. The
data confirms the culture of patronage, corruption and the difference between law and reality that
characterize Dominican institutions.

Concepts and Definitions
In this thesis, I discuss several concepts, such as “soft power strategy” by Joseph Nye. Nye
offers a diplomacy model that explains impact on foreign public perception. As Jian Wang explains
“Foreign public opinion is gaining ever more significance in forming an emerging globalized
public and influencing international political process and outcome” (Wang, 2005, p. 91). In the
case of the Dominican Republic, the declarations in the international media about racism in the
country demonstrated that the Dominican authorities were alert to how their national reputation is
constructed. The strategy of soft power in diplomacy provides a model for a coherent, coordinated

1

Citizen participation is a non-partisan civic movement established on 31 October 1993, arising as a result of a
process of reflection among citizens, to achieve from the participation of the civil society, respect for the will of the
people in the electoral process to face the floating corruption and to strengthen the political institutions of the
country.
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and structured diplomacy rather than the creation of a defensive, or an impromptu diplomacy
(Wang, 2005).
The basic distinction between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy is, according to
Melissen that “the former is about relationships between the representatives of states, or other
international actors; whereas the latter targets the general public in foreign societies and more
specific non-official groups, organizations and individuals” (Melissen, 2005, p. 5). The Dominican
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is challenged to leave the old traditional form of diplomacy and adopt
“public diplomacy.” Wang describes public diplomacy as “not merely about advocating and
promoting political and economic goals to the international public; it is, instead, about relationship
building between nations and cultures through better communication” (Wang, 2005, p. 93).
Another concept I use in my analysis is patronage. That is, the remuneration for political
favors between officials and citizens using state resources. Richard Graham points out that
patronage has developed in Latin American countries through the activity of social and economic
elites. Further, Graham stresses that people have accepted this political behavior and have not
traditionally considered it to be unethical because “it was rooted in an ancient social system and
ultimately in familial and interpersonal relationship built up over a long time” (Graham, 1990, p.
7). Patronage is also referred to as “political clientelism” and it has been a characteristic of many
Latin American governments. The executive power is usually the incubator of clientelism.
Presidents have used clientelism through their political campaigns to obtain votes by providing
jobs to the people who supported them. In the case of the Dominican Republic, Joaquín Balaguer
went to the streets a few months before the elections and gave food to people in the villages. In the
case of this study, I highlight the high levels of clientelism by evaluating the payrolls of the
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and how political alliances were a principal factor in the spread of
clientelism.
Wilfredo Lozano explains that the power of institutions in the Dominican Republic and in
Latin America are related to states, social classes and elites. Lozano describes government as “the
package of rules, formal or informal, which govern relations between different actors and
organizations in the principal areas of social, economic and cultural life” (Lozano, 2010, p. 2).
Government institutions in the Dominican Republic are characterized by lobbying and personal
influences, and are thus weak.
The Dominican Republic has a myriad of laws; however, there is a lack of execution. The
diplomat and lawyer Rafael Molina Morillo explains that the country has a collection of laws for
everything, and it appears that the nation has high institutional consolidation. However, the main
problem that the country faces is that “nobody fulfills them” (Mis Buenos Días, Morillo, 2004).
Likewise, the former diplomat in United States and Canada highlights that the first people who
violate the laws are public officials. Consequently, the nation has weak institutions.
Foreign Affairs-New York emphasizes that the problem with the rule of law is that, even
though elites discuss the necessity of implementing the laws, they do not want to obey the laws.
As Thomas Carothers stresses, “most Latin American governments have acknowledged the need
for rule-of-law reform and are taking steps toward it, or at least proclaiming that they will. But
judicial and police reform has run into walls of bureaucratic indifference and entrenched interests”
(Carothers, 1998, p. 1). Additionally, Carothers argues that Latin American systems are full of
corruption, cynicism, and impunity with a disparity in what the rule of law and legal institutions
must be. Carothers describes that the rule of law has to be equal for everybody and that the judicial
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system has to be autonomous and neutral without the manipulation of political and economic elites
(Carothers, 1998).
In the book Informal Institutions and Democracy, Helmke and Levitsky (2006) describe
the difference between informal and formal institutions in Latin America. The authors evaluate the
effectiveness of institutions and explain that laws in Latin America are difficult to put into practice.
The authors point out that the rule of law is not implemented because many legislators try to make
profit rather than enforce the laws (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006) There is no clarity about the
sanctions that exist in the Dominican Republic when a diplomat is not exercising his/her functions
abroad, even though the Constitution condemns all forms of corruption in the organs of the state.
The culture of breaking the law is also problematic of the level of the Dominican citizen.
Helmke and Levitsky compare the citizen’s perception and the success of formal institutions, and
analyzes that, “where formal institutions are effective, actors believe there is a high probability
that noncompliance will be sanctioned by official authorities. Where formal rules and procedures
are ineffective, actors believe the probability of enforcement (and hence the expected cost of
violation) to be low” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, p. 13). I have shown that there is a discourse
between the rule of law and how states create laws to satisfy international legitimacy.

Organization of the Thesis
In chapter 2, I discuss how global changes and technologies provide a new perspective to
ensure public diplomacy and the importance that a country actually pays attention to international
public opinion. I analyze the relative position between states and diplomacy in the region. I then
describe the difference between traditional diplomacy and the new public diplomacy. Experts
agree that most Latin American nations follow outdated foreign affairs parameters and are
retrograde in terms of soft power, especially where the state does not integrate local citizens and
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foreign publics into its overall strategy. This chapter also discusses my interview with the
Dominican historian, Mu Kien Sang, who stresses the difficulties of achieving soft power in the
country. Sang provides historical arguments that are valuable in understanding Dominican
international relations during the Trujillo dictatorship and the governments of Joaquin Balaguer
and Leonel Fernández. In addition, I describe the reactionary diplomacy and the nationalist
discourse that Dominicans have developed around foreign affairs.
In chapter 3, I point out that the government used a nationalist discourse against the
international criticism to hide the weaknesses in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIREX, 2015).
I make the argument that there is a lack of seriousness in the institution because Foreign Service
officers are not working in the places that they are assigned, and this creates weak diplomacy. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic has been admonished for hiring surplus
personnel. In 2014, the institution had 1,396 officials published on the payroll; however, in 2015
the minister of Foreign Affairs claims that 1,200 officials were removed. These and other
irregularities highlight the urgency for true accountability in Dominican diplomacy.
Also in chapter 3, I analyze 3 variables: patronage, corruption, and the lack of adherence
to the law. I show how alliances between political parties create patronage and how corruption
affects the Ministry. I examine the MIREX payrolls from 2013 and 2015, where high levels of
corruption and political clientelism were established. In this chapter, I also evaluate three
documents concerning the Ministry and demonstrate how state governments and citizens have
sometimes struggled to implement the laws. I argue that both the state and the citizens believe that
the laws are pieces of paper that can be removed or adjusted when they want.
In chapter 4, I conclude by describing the consequences of the institutional weaknesses of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I also explore some implications of this problem; the Dominican
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state constructed a sense of nationalism in order to hide the internal issues in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. I identify the importance of listening to international public opinion and the role
of citizen participation that would be required in order to obtain diplomatic accountability and
accomplish soft power.
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CHAPTER II
Dominican Foreign Diplomatic History
Introduction
Dominican foreign policy continues to have many shortcomings. In this chapter I analyze
the historical context of Dominican diplomacy in order to scrutinize the principal factors that have
damaged the institution. In the first part of this chapter, I stress how globalization has changed the
Dominican perspective on diplomacy. The new challenges to diplomacy offer countries without
military or economic power a way to impact foreign public opinion through the application of soft
power. Before I focus on the history of foreign affairs in the Dominican Republic, I present a brief
overview of Latin American diplomacy and the reasons some countries of the region continue to
face problems. One reason why countries like the Dominican Republic do not achieve high levels
of soft power is because of the weak relationship between diplomacy and the state. For that reason,
I claim that in order to live up to the new challenges of diplomacy, the Dominican Republic has to
evaluate how diplomats and executives are managing foreign policy.
In the second part of this chapter, I discuss the views of Mu-Kien Sang, who is an historian
and an expert in Dominican international relations. Sang agrees with the analysis of the Dominican
Republic’s diplomacy as “defensive” and she describes the different periods in the history of
Dominican foreign relations. She highlights four stages in the diplomatic history from the
dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930-1961), through the government of Leonel
Fernández’s: Dominican Liberation Party (1996-2000, 2004-2012). At the end of this chapter, I
13

evaluate the last few years of Dominican diplomacy and discuss two instances where the national
government implemented a reactionary diplomacy. This chapter seeks to unveil the changes that
must be addressed in order to develop credible external relations in the Caribbean country.
The Development of a New Diplomacy
Global changes and technology have changed the conditions under which foreign relations
are executed and developed, not only in the Dominican Republic but in all of Latin America. Mora
and Hey (2003) analyze the diplomatic behavior in Latin American and Caribbean countries. They
claim that one of the problems in Latin American and Caribbean foreign affairs is that the political
culture in these countries allows for highly personalized administration, and also that the executive
branch has a tendency towards authoritarian rule in foreign policy. Likewise, these authors find
four spheres that together influence the effectiveness of the country’s foreign policies: (1) the
idiosyncrasies of individual presidents, (2) the role of the domestic political institutions, (3) the
role of civil society organizations, and (4) the conflict between each state and the structure of
international organizations (Mora & Hey, 2003).
Mora and Hey (2003) make several important observations; the first one is about the
abundant presence of the United States in the foreign policies of Latin American states. In that
sense, the strong imperialistic presence is not implemented by force; instead, it is reinforced by
aid and U.S. development policy. The anti-communist ideologies established by the US have been
replaced by “…economic matters… as the fulcrum upon which core influence is pressed on [Latin
America]” (Mora & Hey, 2003, p. 9). Mora and Hey’s second observation is that the presidents in
Latin America designed a specific foreign policies agenda that highlights only national problems
such as poverty, health and environmental difficulties instead of creating externally-oriented
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foreign policies proposals. Moreover, another factor that the authors point out is the weakness of
democracy and the institutions that affect the implementation of foreign policy in Latin American
and Caribbean countries.
For all these reasons, many scholars urgently argue for a new concept of foreign policy.
The new diplomacy seeks to integrate features of the old diplomacy with a new approach that
integrates different actors of society to international audiences. It is no longer enough to promote
a “message”, but rather weaker nations must build a relationship between domestic and
international interests. .
Cull highlights a horizontal projection, which allows a multilateral integration between the
state and others actors. In contrast to the old form of doing diplomacy that was conducted in a
bilateral form only between the states, “public diplomacy is a two-way street: a process of mutual
influence, whereby a state (or other international player) facilitates engagement between publics
or tunes its own policies to the map of foreign public opinion” (Cull, 2010, p. 12).
Jan Melissen (2005) calls for a rethinking of diplomacy, and suggests that countries have
a tension between traditional and new paradigms because the world has changed. Likewise,
Melissen explains the importance of reorganizing diplomacy in such a way as to contemplate how
people are more involved with global information technologies. These actions underline a
transformation and a network approach in public diplomacy (Melissen, 2005, p. 29).
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NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SOFT POWER

NETWORK MODEL

* Propaganda

* Role of Non-Government Agents.
* The promotion of Human Rights.

* Nation-Branding

* The spread of democratic values.

* Cultural Relations

* Good Governance.
* The role of the media in civil
society.

Figure 1. The Concept of New Public Diplomacy by Jan Melissen.
*Graphic provided by the student for the purposes of this study

Melissen proposes to move to another form of diplomacy where the government makes a
connection with public affairs, and puts away the traditional form where diplomacy, which was
only between states. The network model not only includes a soft power approach, but also focuses
on the dialogue with foreign publics through non-governmental agents to promote and developing,
the promotion of human rights, the spread of democratic values, good governance and the role of
the media in civil society (Melissen, 2005, p. 22).
The new diplomacy is extremely important because it integrates the use of soft power with
civil society. Countries around the world can influence other countries without coercion or military
interventions, but rather with persuasion. Melissen clarifies that people mistakenly believe that the
role of soft power is only a mode of propaganda in other countries. But soft power is also the
exercise of power over opinion in the international arena (Melissen, 2005). This new concept of

16

diplomacy is not only relevant for state-to-state relations, as it was in the past; this new diplomacy
also involves relations between the state and other actors in society.

Another aspect of soft power is the state's credibility. Academics such as Craig Hayden
(2012) examine the controversy around soft power in contemporary societies. Hayden formulates
several questions to clarify any potential confusion about how to think about soft power and what
its role is in international relations, and also to distinguish it from propaganda. Hayden points out
that, “the simplicity of soft power‘s basic notion relies on some unelaborated assumptions about
what counts as influence, persuasion, and the supposed values of symbolic and cultural attributes
in relation to power” (Hayden, 2012, p. 28). Hayden also stresses that the concept is not only a
combination of persuasion and attraction, but also is an exploration of how nation-states behave
and create their agenda to achieve credibility in diplomacy through strong communication
(Hayden, 2012).
Dominican Foreign Affairs and Soft Power
The challenges to Dominican diplomacy lie in the need to achieve a better understanding
of soft power. Given its lack of hard power, the Dominican Republic can only compete with other
countries in terms of public diplomacy through the use of soft power. Even though the country has
strong foreign relations in terms of economic and cultural relations, it has to evaluate its political
values and foreign policies. Joseph Nye (2004) describes the three important sources of soft power.
The author points out that soft power is not only used to achieve cultural impact with external
constituencies, but that it relies on political values and formal foreign policies. A strong democracy
and the values of human rights are tools that can help to accomplish soft power.
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According to Nye (2004), soft power fails when a government is disinterested in others’
opinions about its foreign policies. Another weakness in soft power comes from the incoherence
of national and international policies, and/or the lack of credibility. These three factors are
important for analyzing soft power in the Dominican Republic.
The Dominican constitution contains some articles that frame the importance of foreign
policies within its the national politics. However, the laws are often violated and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has inadequate planning. Pablo A. Mariñez, sociologist and former ambassador
in Mexico, explains that the foreign policies of the Dominican Republic have been passive and
only enacted to protect its position in the international community. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is driven under international pressure or under decisions of the executive power (Mariñez, 2001).
The defensive and reactionary foreign policies of the Dominican government today were
implemented based on the 2010 Haiti Earthquake and the negative international reaction to the
Dominican Republic’s response.
The case of Dominican politics against Haiti is generally seen as a human rights failure.
After the Haiti earthquake in 2010 the Dominican Republic implemented its bilateral relations with
Haiti, and foreign affairs served as a collaborative path with the International Community. Even
though the government prepared a plan for Haiti’s reconstruction, the tense relationship between
the nations continued. Diplomacy failed because it was a short-term government reaction that was
designed to put the Dominican and Haiti relations in a better position in front of the international
community. I am not arguing that the Dominican Republic did not contribute humanitarian aid
towards Haiti, or that the Dominican contributions were not valuable in Haiti’s reconstruction.
However, what I claim is that the country’s foreign affairs approach demanded more strategic and
long-term diplomacy, not a reactive diplomacy.

18

The criticism from the international media that the Dominican Republic is a racist country,
should have urged the country to pay attention to foreign public opinion. Nicholas Cull points out
that the first step in public diplomacy is not to speak, but to listen --“the best public diplomacy
begins with listening: systematically collecting and analyzing the opinion of foreign publics” (Cull,
2010). Instead of listening, the Dominican government began a counter-attack of a intensely
nationalist discourse.
Philip Seib (1997) writes about how the media has a huge impact on foreign policy,
explaining that this is a debate that permeates political communication. The debate is about who
transforms the news: does the media shape the agenda of the government or do the policymakers
transform the news? According to Seib, there is a semantic distinction between communication
and politics. The news media impacts foreign policy, but other scholars claim that the media does
not determine the response of the government to other countries (Seib, 1997, p. 139). The author
clarifies and disagrees with theories which stress that the role of diplomacy “should not be
subordinate to or transformed by public opinion” (Seib, 1997, p. xiii). On the contrary, Seib
emphasizes that the stand of the news media has not changed and continues to affect the public
opinion and the government’s decisions (Seib, 1997). Even though I am not describing the
relationship between public diplomacy and the media, I argue that the media provides a challenge
for Dominican diplomacy. However, in order to implement the new concept of public diplomacy
Dominican government should first create a qualified Foreign Service staff. In order to do this they
will have to dismantle the culture of patronage, corruption and illegality in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
In the following paragraphs, I highlight the reactive diplomacy and the weaknesses of the
Dominican Foreign Affairs through a conversation with the Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang.
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A Brief Encounter with the Diplomatic History
The academic Mu-Kien Sang describes the history of Dominican diplomacy. My questions
for Sang (in our virtual encounter) were geared towards Dominican soft power, and I wanted to
know her perspective about diplomacy in the country. Sang argues that Dominican diplomacy has
not acquired clear guidelines for soft power:
Dominican Foreign Affairs is characterized by the politics of the political parties that have
predominated over national interests. The Foreign Ministry has a unique heritage that
comes from the Reformist Party (PRSC) during the eight years of President Leonel
Fernández’s term (Liberation Party, PLD). This made the ministry an institution guided by
personal interest. Clientelism and favoritism are two of the most serious problems in our
diplomacy (Interview and translation conducted by the author, 4 February 2016).

Dominican diplomacy faces many challenges that I discuss in the next chapter. Likewise,
Sang is concerned with four aspects in Dominican international relations: lack of professionalism,
instability, lack of training in international politics, and policies defined in a personalistic way by
the executive power.
Sang also described diplomacy during the Trujillo dictatorship and the presidency of
Leonel Fernández. She explained that foreign affairs in the country had two significant periods:
The history of foreign policy in the Dominican Republic has changed a lot. I argue
that before Trujillo, there was no real foreign policy by the Dominican State. During
the 19th century, from 1844 to Trujillo, diplomacy in the country was only
concerned with geopolitical interests, and not viewed as an opportunity for the
Dominican state. For example, France, England, Spain and the United States were
all competing for the market and for control of the Caribbean. These countries had
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powerful consuls in the national territory; however, they only represented the
international interests of those nations.
A true foreign policy was developed during the Trujillo dictatorship, where
diplomatic representation increased. The dictator believed that he needed to have
open policies. Nevertheless, the main purpose of Trujillo’s strategy, in addition to
seeking diplomatic representation, was his pursuit of espionage. For this reason the
dictator designated key positions in the diplomatic corps for his right-hand men.
Another clear element in the Trujillo international policy was the recruitment of
people with a very high level of education. He recruited “la crème de la crème” of
the Dominican intellectual class (Interview and translation conducted by the author,
4 February 2016).
Other academics point out that the foreign affairs of the Trujillo dictatorship occurred under
the framework of the Good Neighbor Policy. The Good Neighbor Policy was active during the
period between 1933 until 1943 when the United States modified its foreign policy in response to
the rising threat in Europe. The new policy approach was framed around the idea of nonintervention and respect for other countries’ domestic policies (Wood, 2010). This policy was
exemplified when the dictator allied with Washington in its fight against Asian and European
fascism. Trujillo's foreign policy was based on military and economic growth in the context of its
alliance with the United States (Roorda, 1998). Likewise, Trujillo’s international strategies were
elaborated to protect national sovereignty. The idea of national protection was a way to justify
gaining more control over Dominicans and concealing human rights violations during the regime.
Roorda (1998) points out that “Trujillo’s skillful handling of Dominican foreign relations allowed
him to perpetrate his genocide of Haitian residents in the Dominican Republic in 1937” (Roorda,
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1998, p. 4). This military alliance with the U.S helped him avoid being persecuted by the
International Community for the Parsley Massacre. Trujillo manipulated the concept of “good
neighbor” and manipulated foreign and domestic policies (Roorda, 1998, p. 89).
Among the foreign affairs actions of the Trujillo dictatorship was the creation of several
important institutions: the diplomatic school, through the Organic law of 1964; the participation
of the Dominican Republic in the United Nations; and several signature international agreements
(Cadette, 2015). Nevertheless, the violations of the regime transcended the national level and the
dictator was accused of conspiring to murder and kidnap the Venezuelan president Romulo
Betancourt and the writer Jesús Galíndez in the United States (Cadette, 2015).
In my interview with Sang, the historian describes other periods of foreign policy. Sang points out
that:
Another bright point of the Dominican foreign policy was, without doubt, the first
four years of the Leonel Fernández government between 1996 and 2000. The
country managed to break the inertia that the governments of Balaguer and the PRD
had imposed (Interview and translation conducted by the author, 4 February 2016).
Dominican foreign policy has had many ups and downs, and it has always been strongly
influenced by nationalism, which did not allow for improving relations with Haiti. Instead
nationalism has gotten in the way of formulating a coherent approach towards the United States
and the European Union. According to Mora and Hey (2003) the Dominican Republic has
attempted to move from nationalism to globalization. The authors examine the international
policies during Joaquín Balaguer’ (Reformist Party, PRSC) and Leonel Fernández’s (Liberation
Party, PLD) governments. The Balaguer government was passive and isolated, triggering the
attention of the international community, due to the human rights violations committed against
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Haitians. Balaguer faced the accusations with a “sovereignty discourse.” Mora and Hey (2003)
describe Balaguer’s international relations during the Cold War, explaining that:
Joaquín Balaguer flourished in this international environment since he was able to
play to both domestic and international groups, satisfying the former by nationalist
policies and economics and the latter by his staunch anticommunist position and by
repressing the left. The end of the Cold War did not immediately affect much of
official Dominican foreign policy since the isolationist, nationalist Balaguer
remained in power until 1996, although changes occurred in the area of economics
(Mora and Hey, 2003, p.105).
By contrast, the new president, Leonel Fernández, was focused on security, the
empowerment of multilateral institutions, and his initiative of hosting important summits in the
country. At least initially, though, Leonel Fernández contributed to the development of the
Dominican foreign affairs.
Mora and Hey (2003) highlight that:
… During the Fernández government, for the first time in thirty-one years, the
Dominican government allowed the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights
to visit the country. Fernández also improved diplomacy with the government of
Haiti. He visited Haiti, addressed the Haitian parliament, and engaged in warmer
relations with the government of Haiti. At the same time, improved relations
between Haitians and Dominicans may be made more possible by the increased
importance of diasporic communities from both countries in the domestic politics
of their home countries (Mora and Hey, 2003, p.115).
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Contemporary Dominican foreign policies changed the relationship to Haiti. Even though
the society is still dealing with racism vis-a-vis its neighbor, Leonel Fernández contributed to the
development of Dominican foreign affairs.
Fernández made progress with regard to the Dominican response to international conflicts,
but this was later criticized by the local media. Fernández, who has been called “the mediator,”
helped to resolve some problems in other countries, such as the conflicts between Venezuela and
Colombia, and the political crisis in Honduras. He also pushed the Dominican Republic to help in
the reconstruction of Haiti after the earthquake in 2010. However Dominican public opinion
accused Fernández of developing a personal diplomacy rather than a national diplomacy.
Fernández was accused of pursuing his own interests over those of the country. Fernández formed
a non-profit organization, the Global Foundation for Democracy and Development (GFDD), apart
from his government. The organization is an international network, because it is located in the
Dominican Republic, Washington and New York. His institution has been accused of receiving
corrupt funds.
A Present Overview of Dominican Foreign Affairs
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has pursued the respect and recognition of the international
community, forgetting its domestic problems. The question is: How can the country achieve
pragmatism in diplomacy when it is dealing with serious institutional issues? Foreign relations
should be geared not only toward improving international reputation, but also should involve
listening to international voices. The ex-foreign minister, Carlos Morales Troncoso explained in
the document "Our Foreign Relations" how the Dominican Republic has reached high levels of
recognition through tourism and investment. However, these measurements of what has been
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achieved by the Foreign Service are only attractive in terms of the country’s economy. In terms of
diplomacy, the country has not yet been strategic.
The Dominican Republic has expanded its foreign policy to other nations in Africa, the
Middle East and Asia. Importantly, Morales (2012) points out that the country has served as an
intermediary to handle conflicts in the region and has succeeded in restoring peace in some nations
(Morales Troncoso, 2012). However, recognition and diplomatic expansion are not equal to
execution, credibility and communication. Although the former are important in diplomatic
matters, it is not possible to gain recognition when the national politics are incongruent. The
following figure highlights the different factors that are important to influencing other countries.
In 2015, the international community condemned the Dominican Republic’s racist policy
of revoking the citizenship status of Dominicans of Haitian descent. International black
movements added to this ‘destructive propaganda’ according to the Dominican government.
However, the accusation of racism raises the question: was this really a campaign to discredit the
country, or was this criticism the result of the mismanagement of national and international policy?
International relations experts highlight the importance of state credibility and listening in foreign
policy, and they say that in order for a country to achieve soft power in public diplomacy, the
relationship between credibility and coherence must be well-defined.
In reaction to the international condemnation, the Dominican Republic began to rethink its
foreign policies. The Dominican government reacted, and countered the accusations of racism and
once again prepared a new public diplomacy strategy. The “Strategic Plan 2015-2020: The New
Foreign Relations Politics” summarizes the intentions of a new diplomacy and recognizes the
institutions’ weaknesses in terms of its Haitians relations, and the Dominican Diaspora. The
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current president, Danilo Medina, has claimed that the most important obstacles for Dominican
public diplomacy goals are corruption and the lack of professionalism (MIREX, 2015). The
proposal offers objectives and explains the new programs which will be used to achieve them.
However, the new document ignores guidelines for how the programs will be executed. Once
again, the Dominican government reacts, without deliberate planning.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed the challenges to achieving a new concept of public diplomacy.
Many governments in Latin America established a personalistic foreign policy and relied on weak
democracies and institutions. Second, I highlighted the importance of a new framework for
diplomacy that can be aligned with global changes. I argued that the new concept of public
diplomacy, (which includes soft power) should not only be based be based on persuasion and
cultural factors. It is essential for states to achieve credibility and interactivity between foreign
publics and national publics.
Furthermore, I presented the voices of many scholars, including an interview with the
Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang who explained that Dominican diplomacy has critical
weaknesses, such as the absence of planning, lack of professionalism and clientelism. I focused on
the history of Dominican foreign affairs by the discussing three different periods: the Trujillo
dictatorship, and the governments of Joaquín Balaguer and Leonel Fernández.
The Trujillo dictatorship can be said to have been the “enlightenment period” of
Dominican diplomacy because the tyrant created the first diplomatic school, the organic law and
he recruited a professional diplomatic corps. Nonetheless, terror and human rights violations is
what the country got in return.
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The second period I described was the government of Joaquin Balaguer, which only dealt
with the creation of a nationalist discourse that segregated the country. However, in the
government of Leonel Fernández, foreign affairs expanded, and the country achieved a respectable
international reputation. The Dominican Republic hosted summits and handled different conflicts
with other countries in the region, despite the accusations that Fernández created a highly
personalistic diplomacy.
Lastly, I highlighted that in spite of these achievements, Dominican diplomacy is still
passive and reacts only under international pressure. I stressed that a new form of diplomacy that
includes soft power is urgently needed in the country because the government only reacts, and
lacks a proactive strategy. An example of this is the recent creation of the “Strategic Plan 20152020,” a project that seems to be a favorable path toward a new diplomacy. However, in order to
achieve the plan, the nation has to analyze the structural problems within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
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CHAPTER III
A Political Introspection of how the Dominican Republic Constructed Foreign Policies
Introduction
“Dominican Republic has it all.” This is the slogan from the Tourism Ministry and it is
intended to promote the island as a tourist paradise. While this campaign aims at presenting the
beauty of the country’s beaches, mountains, and the friendliness of its people, it actually bears
some deeper truth: the Dominican has indeed “everything,” from the most beautiful to the ugliest,
and this slogan could as well point at those realities that are incongruent with the idea of “paradise.”
The Dominican Republic has everything not only in terms of tourism, but also in terms of
institutions. Importantly, the Dominican Republic has difficulty enforcing its own laws. In this
chapter, I analyze the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution that impacts both national and
international public opinion. Sticking with my metaphor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also “has
it all.” In fact, as I will argue here, this Ministry has become an incubator of corruption, political
clientelism, and impunity.
I examine patronage in the Dominican Republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I argue that
the Dominican government is deeply implicated in patronage and personalistic clientelism. To
prove this, I examine two payroll documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 20122013 and 2015. Both of these documents evidence high levels of patronage.
I point out that another variable involved in the failure of diplomacy is corruption. The
“Blue Book” of the United Nations reveals that the country has more UN delegates than Mexico,
or Argentina or Brazil. Likewise, in the document Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, published
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by Transparency International, the Dominican Republic ranks 115 in its overall governmental
corruption, placing it behind other countries with much larger populations, such as Mexico, Brazil
and Colombia.
I highlight that the main characteristic of most Dominican governmental institutions is not
the creation of documents or more laws; it is the culture of law-breaking by politicians and citizens.
Even though at times the creation of new projects seems to be a good initiative in the context of
public diplomacy, in most cases there is a lack of execution. As a result, the distance between the
law and reality is a serious problem in the context of diplomacy. Additionally, I assess the different
laws that govern the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Article 146 from the Constitution, the
314 Organic Law in 1964, and the Protocol for Transparency and Institution signed by the current
Dominican president, Danilo Medina. In conclusion, I indicate the importance of having a
resolution which provides more accountability and allows for more progress in diplomacy in the
Dominican Republic.
Patronage in the Dominican Republic has restricted a new generation of professionals and
in the process has damaged the promotion of external relations. Strong diplomacy implies the
necessity of a government, which communicates with foreign publics in an attempt to “bring about
understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national
goals and policies” (Melissen, 2005, p. 12). The Dominican government needs to face the culture
of patronage because of the negative impact it has on the foreign policies of the country. The
assignment of jobs to an inexperienced candidate, only for him to acquire votes and personal
connections, emphasizes patronage.
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Electoral Coalition Building: The Beginning of Favor
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the result of vote donations for political favors and jobs.
Alliances between the minority political groups with the majority political parties in the Dominican
Republic have only reflected the culture of patronage in the country. This exchange of votes for
favors and political positions fragments national institutions in general, and blocks the exercise of
effective diplomacy.
The desperation for victory allows political party clientelism, and the Dominican Ministry
of Foreign Affairs is a clear example of this. The Dominican economist and expert on international
relations, Gedeon Santos describes Dominican foreign policy as reflecting the characteristics of
“our underdevelopment, isolation and lack of institutional improvisation” (Santos, 2013, p. 1).
Santos stresses that the foreign policy of the country has been formed primarily for the purpose of
creating diplomatic jobs.
However, Santos also highlights that patronage in the Ministry came following the Trujillo
regime, because during the dictatorship foreign policy had a consistent and aggressive role in the
international arena (Santos, 2013). The main reason for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ lack of
strong policies is corruption and political party clientelism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
been a vehicle for power seekers who obtain their positions through personal and political
connections.
Because of political ambitions and the desire to win elections, Dominican candidates
started to form alliances between political parties. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a
recruitment institution for politicians who formed strategic alliances to obtain jobs. Even though
the Dominican Republic has more than twenty political parties, only three can be considered
“major parties.” However, the three political parties: the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD),
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Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), and the Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) have
made alliances amongst themselves to obtain power, and have fostered political patronage.
Wilfredo Lozano explains that after the death of the three principal political leaders and founders
of the three major parties (Juan Bosch (PLD), Francisco Peña Gómez (PRD) and Joaquín Balaguer
(PRSC)), the political parties experienced transformation and party fragmentation (Lozano, 2010).
Lozano stresses that the party systems and the state have a relationship of
“neopatrimonialism and clientelism performance” on the electoral structure (Lozano, 2010). One
of the reasons these new parties donate their votes is because it has been difficult for them to obtain
power through their own parties. Edward Gonzalez-Acosta defines vote buying as a strategy of
political clientelism (Gonzalez-Acosta, 2008). Likewise, Acosta highlights that the bartering of
votes and public resources and services is part of a system that reinforces subordination. As Acosta
indicates, “the logic of clientelism, in essence is that the winner will favor those who supported
him/her, and those that did not will find a ‘closed’ door when they go knocking for help”
(Gonzalez-Acosta, 2008, p. 1).
In addition, Richard Graham (1990) explains that there is a similarity between generosity
and power. Graham highlights that there is a relationship between rewards, loyalty and obedience
in the political institutions that were implemented during the colonial period (Graham, 1990).
Particularly in the case of the Dominican Republic, the patterns of patronage have not changed
because new politicians do not have sufficient influence to gain power, and their votes are used
for their own economic ends. As a result, “clientelism has replaced ideology as the organizing
principle of party politics in the Dominican Republic, and the former Marxist left has also taken
part in this. Several tiny leftist groups have formed electoral alliances with the PRD or the PLD,
mostly in exchange for clientelistic favors” (Jana, et al., 2008, p. 28).
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An example of electoral alliance is described by the Dominican historian Roberto Cassa in
the article “Negotiated Elections,” he explains that the “Pact of Democracy” was a document that
reduced Joaquín Balaguer’s term to two years and authorized a new process of elections in 1996.
In that sense, the pact forced the end of the presidential term of Balaguer who had been in power
for over twenty-two years. Secondly, the Pact of Democracy also altered the Dominican
Constitution and proposed that in order to win the elections of 1996, the new candidate had to win
50 percent of the votes.
The confirmation of this treaty and the changes to the Constitution opened the doors for
alliances and political fragmentation. Cassa explains that with the pact in 1996, Balaguer explored
a new plan to leave the presidential seat without entirely giving up political power --“in the
meantime, he prepared the greatest number of obstacles to prevent the predicted triumph of the
PRD in 1996” (Cassá, 1997, p. 20). Balaguer prepared an alliance with the elected candidate
Leonel Fernández from the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) because he opposed his own party’s
candidate. Fernández won the elections in 1996 with the help of Balaguer, but his presidency was
at the same time full of political commitments to the PRSC, including an agreement to hand over
control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Patronage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The culture of patronage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is rooted in the alliance between
the Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) and the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD). The
positions of the PRSC foreign ministers were the result of a political transition and clientelism.
Carlos Morales Troncoso was the vice president between 1986- 1994 in the government of
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Balaguer (PRSC). Subsequently, Morales Troncoso was also chancellor of the country during two
periods: 1994-1996 and 2004-2014 during the Fernández (PLD) governments.
The following table represents the list of different chancellors of the Dominican Republic.
The table shows that members of the Reformist Party (PRSC) managed the Foreign Ministry
during the governments of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) after the Pact of Democracy,
which established a strategic alliance.
Table 1. List of Dominican Chancellors
Government
PRSC
PRSC
PLD
PRD
PRD
PLD
PLD

Years
1994-1996
1996
1996-2000
2000-2003
2003-2004
2004-2014
2014-Present

Chancellors
Carlos Morales Troncoso
Caonabo Javier Castillo
Eduardo Latorre Rodríguez
Hugo Tolentino Dipp
Frank Guerrero Pratss
Carlos Morales Troncoso
Andres Navarro

Political Party
PRSC
PRSC
PRSC
PRD
PRD
PRSC
PLD

*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study
The table represents the years of political patronage after the alliance between Joaquín
Balaguer and Leonel Fernández in 1996. Fernández won the elections with the collaboration of
Balaguer and most of the ministers were from the PRSC party, with the exception of the four years
when the Revolutionary Dominican Party (PRD) ruled. Fernández had a political commitment for
fourteen years, and it was after the death of Carlos Morales Troncoso in 2014 and under a new
mandate with Danilo Medina (PLD) that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs obtained a chancellor of
his own political party.
The 2013 list of diplomatic corps employees in the Dominican Republic has 1,584
members. However, this data analysis is based on the 330 officials who were identified by name.
I show here how patronage is evident in the 2013 payroll. The list shows that 105 State Department
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employees were members of the Reformist Party PRSC, and that senator Felix Bautista
recommended 101, including family members and political allies. And additional 85 of them were
cousins, spouses and family members of civil servants and former presidents.

2013 MOFA PAYROLL
Series1
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105

101

85
39

Reformist
Party (PRSC)

Senator Felix Civil Servants
Members
Bautista
or Former without salary
Presidents

Figure 2. Officials Identified by Name in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acento.com.do, 2014)
*Graphic provided by the author for the purposes of this study

2013 MOFA PAYROLL
Reformist Party (PRSC)
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Figure 3. Officials Identified by Name in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
*Graphic provided by the author for the purposes of this study
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These graphics show that in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a culture of patronage
with the exchange of political favors for votes. The 2013 MOFA payroll shows that 32% of the
employees were from the Reformist Party (PRSC), and 30% of the employees were recommended
by the Senator Felix Bautista, including not only his family members, but also of employees who
supported the Dominican Liberation Party in New York. Twenty-six percent of the identified
officials were recommended by civil servants and former presidents and 12% were registered on
the list without salary.
In addition, the list below demonstrates the strategic partnerships and the exchange of votes
for political jobs between the Reformist Party (PRSC) and the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD)
and in the Dominican consular service around the world.
Table 2. Part of the List of Reformist Officials in Embassies, Payroll 2012-2013 published by
the digital newsletter, Acento.com.do, which has a tremendous impact on the Dominican public
opinion. The media has a group of intellectuals, academics and experts who are well known as
critical writers (Acento.com.do, 2014).
No.

NAME

POSITION

COUNTRY

VIRGILIO ALVAREZ
1 BONILLA

AMBASSADOR BILATERAL
COMMISSION

DOM. REP- PUERTO
RICO

2 FLORENTINO CARVAJAL

AMBASSADOR BILATERAL
COMMISSION

DOM. REP- PUERTO
RICO

RICARDO ALBERTO
3 ALMONTE

MINISTER COUNSELOR

CANADA

FRANCISCA MATILDE
4 FRIAS

MINISTER COUNSELOR

ECUADOR

HERNANI ABRAHAM
5 AQUINO

MINISTER COUNSELOR

NICARAGUA

6 DIEGO VALLEJO RAMIREZ MINISTER COUNSELOR

NICARAGUA

*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (official list on Appendix)
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The table shows how electoral support can be seen in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
patterns of loyalty and obedience in relation to protection and support for political parties are signs
of how patronage permeates Dominican institutions. Richard Graham explains the concept of
positions as rewards, as the “conservative use of patronage”. This form of “prizes and rewards”
has an impact on voters because it controls the voting process through manipulation (Graham,
1990, p. 93).
Similarly, the 2013 payroll of the Foreign Service shows that many personnel are family
members, people recommended by senators and deputies, and people who have not had any
diplomatic experience.
The document describes the position, wages, and reveals who they are and by whom the
person was recommended to occupy a position within the institution.
Table 3. Part of the List Recommended by Ministers, Senators or Deputies in Embassies, Payroll
2012-2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014).
NAME
CELESTE
FRANCISCA
1 JIMENEZ

No.

JOSELYNE
ROSARIO
2 ROMERO
VICENTE
ALFONSO
BENGOA
3 ARAGUIZ

YESSICA
ALEJANDRINA
4 SOSA GERMAN

POSITION/COUNTRY
CONSUL/CALIFORNIA,UNITED
STATES

GENERAL-CONSUL/ARUBA

AUXILIARY/BARCELONA,
SPAIN

AUXILIARY/BOSTON, UNITED
STATES
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OBSERVATION
SISTER OF RADHAMES
JIMENEZ, ATTORNEY
GENERAL
WIFE OF RAFAEL
NUNEZ,FORMER
PRESIDENTIAL
SPOKESPERSON

SON OF VICENTE BENGOA,
FINANCE MINISTER
DAUGHTER OF AMBASSADOR
JOSE SOSA AND
RECOMMENDED BY
ALEJANDRINA GERMAN,
FORMER MINISTER OF
EDUCATION

Table 3 (Continued)
No. NAME
CARMEN
VIRGINIA
5 CARDONA
ANDREA
ALTAGRACIA
6 MEDINA
LUISA VIOLETA
SANTANA
7 JIMENEZ

POSITION/COUNTRY

GENERAL-CONSUL/CURACAO
GENERAL-CONSUL/
GUADALUPE

VICE-CONSUL/MONTREAL,
CANADA

OBSERVATION
DAUGHTER OF LIGIA AMADA
MELO, MINISTER OF
EDUCATION
COUSIN OF DANILO MEDINA,
CURRENT PRESIDENT OF THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
RECOMMENDED BY LUIS
MANUEL BONETTI,
ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY
OF THE PRESIDENCY (PLD)

*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (Official List on Appendix)
Corruption in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Dominican government has much documented corruption within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The current president Danilo Medina signed an anti-corruption agreement with
the international organization Transparency International. However, I demonstrate that all of the
Dominican presidents have maintained a silent position vis-à-vis corruption for decades, and the
nation is still plagued with corruption. One symptom of this is that the state positions are not given
by merit. As a consequence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been an institution formed in a
context of extreme corruption. The Dominican Republic is more corrupt than other countries with
larger populations such as Colombia, Mexico and Brazil (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2014).
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Another example of corruption within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is presented in the
Blue Book of the United Nations where the Dominican delegation has 77 members, which is far
greater than Argentina, which has 10; Brazil with 33 and Colombia which has 57 (United Nations,
2015).
This means that the Dominican Republic, with a total population of some 10 million, has
seven times more UN diplomats on its payroll than Argentina, whose total population is some 46
million and more than double the number from Brazil, with a population of over 200 million
people. In other words, in the Dominican Republic there is one UN diplomat for every 129,870
citizens, whereas in Brazil, there is one UN diplomat for every 6,060,606 Brazilians. UN diplomats
are, however, just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Why, then, is the Dominican government
spending so much of its (scarce) financial resources on diplomats?

High Levels of Corruption in 2013 and 2015 Payrolls
Another peculiarity of the payroll is the excessive wages garnered by some of the
ambassadors. An example is the case of the journalist Cesar Medina, who earned $480,000 USD,
in 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do, 2014). Medina exceed by 16.67% the base wage of the president
of the United States, Barack Obama which is USD$400,000.00 per year (Kottasova & Pendergrass,
2015).
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Table 4. The Best Paid in the Dominican Foreign Ministry, Payroll 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do,
2014).

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

NAME

POSITION

CESAR MEDINA ABREU
PEDRO VERGES
HANS DANNENBERG
CASTELLANOS
LAURA FAXAS
RUBEN ARTURO SILIE
VALDEZ
VINICIO TOBAL URENA
MARIA GABRIELA BONNETI
ROSSELLINI
ALEXANDER DE LA ROSA
JOSE TOMAS ARES GERMAN

AMBASSADOR
AMBASSADOR

SPAIN-MADRID
JAPAN-TOKYO

USD$480,000.00
USD$480,000.00

AMBASSADOR
AMBASSADOR

INDIA-NEW DELHI
FRANCE-PARIS
HAITI-PORT-AUPRINCE
ITALY-ROME

USD$414,000.00
USD$384,000.00

USD$324,000.00
USD$300,000.00
USD$264,000.00

ANIBAL DE CASTRO
RENE BIENVENIDO
SANTANA GONZALEZ
JOSE OSVALDO LEGER
AQUINO

AMBASSADOR

EGYPT-CAIRO
ISRAEL-TEL AVIV
JAMAICA-KINGSTON
UNITED STATESWASHINGTON
GUATEMALAGUATEMALA
HONDURASHONDURAS

AMBASSADOR
AMBASSADOR
AMBASSADOR
AMBASSADOR
AMBASSADOR

AMBASSADOR
AMBASSADOR

COUNTRY

SALARY

USD$360,000.00
USD$360,000.00

USD$298,134.48
USD$221,040.00
USD$192,000.00

*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (Official List on Appendix)

Corruption within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created a huge hole in the country’s
budget. Dominican ambassadors earned more than Mexican ambassadors. According to the
newspaper Nacional from Mexico in 2013, the Mexican ambassador in Spain earned
USD$145,113.36; 300% less than the Dominican ambassador (Agencia Reforma, 2013). Most
Dominican officials earned more money than Mexican officials in 2013
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Table 5. Wages of Dominican Ambassadors versus Mexican Ambassadors.

COUNTRY

DOMINICAN
AMBASSADOR

MEXICAN
AMBASSADORS

SPAIN
JAPAN
INDIA
FRANCE
ITALY
EGYPT
ISRAEL

USD$480,000.00
USD$480,000.00
USD$414,000.00
USD$384,000.00
USD$360,000.00
USD$324,000.00
USD$300,000.00

USD$145,113.36
USD$166,907.52
USD$108,209.88
USD$133,837.32
USD$145,113.36
USD$114,000.00
USD$115,861.80

*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study
The Mexican list was reported not only by the Mexican media, but also by the Mexican
Treasury Department and published in 2015, because local Mexican media reported that the
ambassadors from most countries earned more than the country presidents where they are located
in many cases. However, it is still not clear why Dominican ambassadors earned more than the
Mexican ambassadors. Mexico has more impact in the international community than does the
Dominican Republic (Treasury, 2015).
Another list that the media collected is the list of the people who the senator Felix Bautista
recommended to work in the institution. The list points out that the senator recommend 101 people
to be part of the Dominican consulate. Most of the members are from the PLD Political
Commission in New York, and/or family members of the senator.
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Table 6. Recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista, Payroll 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do,
2014).
No.

NAME

POSITION/COUNTRY

OBSERVATION

1 IRMA BAUTISTA

GENERAL CONSUL/CANARY
ISLANDS, SPAIN

SISTER OF FELIX
BAUTISTA

VANTROI ILIENOV
2 PENA

VICE-CONSUL/CANARY
ISLANDS, SPAIN

NEPHEW OF FELIX
BAUTISTA

VICE- CONSUL/PANAMA

KARINA'S HUSBAND
(FELIX BAUTISTA)

4 MILEDIS MARTINEZ

VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO

COUSIN OF FELIX
BAUTISTA

CARLOS MANUEL
5 SANCHEZ ASENSIO

RECOMMENDED BY
VICE-CONSUL/SAINT MARTIN FELIX BAUTISTA

3 CARLOS GONZALEZ

GUILLERMO DE JESUS
6 ANGELES
VICE-CONSUL/SEVILLE

RECOMMENDED BY
FELIX BAUTISTA

7 TERESITA PENA

RECOMMENDED BY
FELIX BAUTISTA

VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO

8 ARISTIDES BAUTISTA VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO

FELIX BAUTISTA'S
BROTHER

LUZ DEL CARMEN
9 RAMOS PUJOLS

RECOMMENDED BY
FELIX BAUTISTA'S
BROTHER

VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO

*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (Official List on Appendix)

Felix Bautista is accused by International Transparency of illegally obtaining funds from
the state. The organization through the campaign “Unmask the Corrupt” points out that the senator
obtained a personal fortune through “money laundering, abuse of power, prevarication and illicit
enrichment” (Transparency International, 2016). The detection of irregularities and corruption in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by international and national media have forced the Dominican

41

government to reorganize the problems associated with diplomats’ payrolls and make a significant
reduction in wages in the diplomatic corps in 2015, but not in the total number of employees.
Ghost Payroll: No-Show Jobs
The government is not dealing with diplomatic corruption; however, the minister Andrés
Navarro recognized that “diplomats do not work, but continued to receive a wage” (Reyes, 2015).
Similarly, the minister points out that in 2015, 1,200 positions were removed, but during the
research I found that the goal has not been fulfilled. In 2012, the Dominican Foreign Ministry had
1,163 officials. In 2013, the Foreign Service had 1,584 member; in 2014 1,396; in August 2015
1,436 and in February of 2016 1,416 officials.

Staff of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
1,600
1,550
1,500
1,450
1,400
1,350
1,300
2013

2014

2015

2016

Figure 4. Amount of Members in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013-2016 (Santana, 2016).
*Graphic elaborated by the author, 25 March 2016
The graphic shows that after the scandal in 2013, there was only a reduction of 188
officials. However, the following years their numbers increased again. What is most notable is that
in September of 2015, the foreign minister Andrés Navarro communicated again that 400 consuls’
positions were removed because the country had “inflated missions of staff and other problems”
(Moreno, 2015)”. This statement indicates that there is an empty discourse, because the 400
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officials or the 1,200 positions never were removed according to the 2016 payroll. Instead, the
2016 payroll has 16 more members.

Additionally, I found that the new payroll in 2015 raises many questions regarding the new
salaries. Examples of this are the low wages for an auxiliary in Belgium, Spain, Italy or Boston,
who earns $920.00 dollars per month. This amounts to $11,040.00 per year, which is under
$15,080 per year – the minimum wage for a full time worker in the United States (Center for
Poverty Research, 2015). In a phone interview, Laury Sánchez (who works in the Department of
Human Resources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santo Domingo) explains that “auxiliary”
positions are granted by administrative and decree forms, and that they work regular hours. The
Dominican Consulate in New York works from 9:00 am to 3:30 pm, while the Consulate in Boston
works from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm (Santana, 2016).
Table 7. Auxiliary Positions, Foreign Affairs Payroll 2015
NAME
ANTOLINA DISLA
GARCIAS
GERALDO DE JESUS
GUZMAN RAMIREZ
MINERVINA
MATILDES FLORIAN
FERRERAS
CRISTINA
ALTAGRACIA
GONZALEZ HERNAND
SOLLY PATRICIA
DURAN OVALLES
SIRIACO CABRERA
RODRIGUEZ

POSITION

CONSULATE
DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN
AUXILIARY
AMBERES,BELGICA
DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN
AUXILIARY
ATHENS,GREECE

SALARIO
USD$11,040.00
USD$11,040.00

AUXILIARY

DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN
BARCELONA, SPAIN

USD$11,040.00

AUXILIARY

DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN
BOSTON, UNITED STATES

USD$11,040.00

DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN
BOSTON, UNITED STATES
DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN
AUXILIARY
FRANCKFURT, GERMANY
AUXILIARY

USD$11,040.00
USD$11,040.00

*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study
The salaries could express political favoritism. The 2015 payroll, while highlighting a
reduction in wages, also point out the inferior wages in cities such as Boston, Athens and Madrid.
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The new reduction of these wages in 2015 does not propose an improvement in political
clientelism. In contrast, the low remuneration can lead to the conclusion that officials are not
working in the countries where they should be exercising diplomacy. The former Dominican
ambassador to Washington reveals that the “United States and Spanish consular officers received
paychecks and never left the country” (Romero, 2014, p. 1).
The Ministry has been listed as an institution whose employees have been termed "empty
bottles" that rely on nepotism and cronyism, a perspective, which has damaged the reputation of
diplomacy.
Another example of corruption in the 2015 payroll is how counselors in the Dominican
embassy in London have the same position and different salaries and representation expenses.
Table 8. Counselors’ Positions, Foreign Affairs Payroll 2015
RELINDA VASQUEZ
ALMONTE
JOSUE ANTINOE
FIALLO
PORTORREAL
MARIA CAROLINA
DIONISIA CASTRO
DIAZ
ARALIS MERCEDES
RODRIGUEZ
COLLADO

COUNSELOR

COUNSELOR

COUNSELOR

COUNSELOR

DOMINICAN
EMBASSY IN
LONDON
DOMINICAN
EMBASSY IN
LONDON
DOMINICAN
EMBASSY IN
LONDON
DOMINICAN
EMBASSY IN
LONDON

1,600.00

1,600.00

3,000.00

6,500.00

1,600.00

2,600.00

1,600.00

3,212.00

*Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study
This table shows a wage variation between officials and suggests that even though the
Ministry reduced the wages, the institution does not have a standard wage for the same position
(MIREX,2015).
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Rosario Adames (2012) demonstrates that many Dominican diplomats spend most of their
time in the Dominican Republic. In many embassies and consular offices, delegates are only
present sporadically and in some places they are asked not to show up at all because they have no
space to seat them. Adames highlights that “it is common for ambassadors to have spouses,
children or other relatives appointed as diplomatic or consular servers in the same country where
they are accredited” (Adames, 2012). The risk of nepotism generates discrimination and does not
open the doors for professionalism in the state institutions.

The Struggle between Law and Reality
“ I believe that we are acting, thinking, conceiving and trying to
go on making not a real country, but one of paper.
The Constitution, the laws… everything… is magnificent,
everything on paper. It has no connection with reality”
(Gabriel García Marquez, quoted in Reiter 2013, p. 142)

Among the reasons that the DR has failed in diplomatic matters is also the breach of laws
that violate existing documents such as the Article 146 in the Dominican Constitution, the
“Protocol of Transparency”. The second reason is the lack of interest in implementing a “new
Organic Law” in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that could facilitate better public diplomacy. The
existing Organic Law was created in 1964 and was not changed until 2011. Bernd Reiter (2013)
explains that when elites come to benefit from their positions, society begins to lose their trust in
the political system, because politicians do not represent the interests of the citizens. Instead,
politicians govern to satisfy their own interests rather than what the people need. Reiter stresses,
there are “…tensions and contradictions, and on the ways different people and groups have sought
to uphold and defend their citizens” (Reiter, 2013, p. xvi). In Dominican Republic the laws are
placed aside.
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Dominicans politicians perceive the laws as largely rhetorical. The tendency of certain
Dominican politicians to change the laws at their convenience is the product of a political heritage
from Joaquín Balaguer. In that sense, the path from dictatorship through a democratic regime in
Dominican Republic was incomplete and has affected how Dominicans perceive their institutions.
Ana Liberato (2013) examines how Joaquin Balaguer is still remembered in the Dominican society
through his “authoritarian pedagogies” (Liberato, 2013).
The phrase that Balaguer used about the Constitution (that it is just “a simple paper”) had
a tremendous impact on the political behavior of both elites and citizens for years afterwards. As
Liberato points out, “the way Dominican society deals with its past affects…their moral authority
and how [the society] struggles for transparency, accountability, inclusion and greater justice and
human rights develop in the country” (Liberato, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, Liberato stresses that the
consequences of Balaguer’s legacy have had repercussions for the practice of citizenship and their
confidence in democratic institutions. Equally important is the analysis of the double discourse of
Balaguer when politicians refer to the laws. The sociologist Rosario Espinal establishes a
comparative analysis in the political mentalities of the dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo and
Joaquín Balaguer. The author points out that both leaders proclaim the law and the exercising of
the rules, and modify laws according to their own benefits (Espinal, 1994).
The relationship between law and reality in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also
explained by the minister Andrés Navarro, who emphasizes, “the problem of the Dominican
Republic is not resources, but institutions” (Pina, 2014, p. 1). This statement underlines that the
national government has a clear position on the problem, but the political rhetoric is stronger than
the execution.
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has laws that reinforce the importance of a diplomatic
career; however, the reality is that the laws concerning the exercise of their functions in the Foreign
Service are far from reality. Bernd Reiter (2013) highlights that laws in Latin American countries
are created to obtain recognition with foreign audiences. Reiter discusses that “by passing beautiful
laws and signing international conventions that are then either not enforced, or actively violated,
the…government is able to garner international legitimacy and thus substitute it for democratic
internal legitimacy” (Reiter, 2013, p. 142). The reality is that laws are established in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, but then the government ignores the laws and the internal problems and bolsters
a national discourse that leads the country to present itself as a victim of foreign attacks. The laws
are not applied or they are changed, following the needs and wishes of those in command.
The contradictions between law and reality in Dominican Republic, particularly in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, become apparent upon examining three important documents: Article
146 of the Constitution, the Organic Law in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Protocol of
Transparency. These legally-binding documents all outline the way foreign policy should be
implemented. I scrutinized the content of these legal documents and found that there is a large gap
between what Dominicans have in the way of legal protection, and what the officials are executing
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Evaluation of the Laws that Govern the Foreign Office
Article 146
The Dominican Constitution provides the legal basis that governs all of its public institutions. The
Dominican Constitution condemns all forms of corruption in the organs of the state. Likewise, the
law specifies that there are sanctions for any person who removes public funds or obtains economic
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benefits from the state. The law clearly establishes sanctions for corruption and indicates penalties
such as the “civil degradation and restitution of its functions” (Dominican Constitution, 2011).
Article 146.-Prohibition of corruption. It is condemned all form of corruption across the organs of
the State. In consequence: 1) shall be punished with the penalties that the law determines, any person
that subtracts public funds or that because of their positions within the organs and agencies of the
state, its dependencies or institutions, get for himself or for a third party economic gain; (2) in the
same way will be punished the person who provides advantages partners, family,close friends,
friends or related; Constitution of the Dominican Republic 84 (3) it is mandatory, in accordance
with the provisions of the law, the affidavit of assets of the public servants, who corresponds always
test the origin of their goods, before and after duties or at the request of the competent authority;
(4) it will be applied to persons convicted of crimes of corruption, without prejudice to other
penalties provided for by law, the penalty civic degradation, and is required for appropriate
restitution unlawfully (Dominican Constitution, 2011).

In the Dominican Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been an institution that the
government uses to benefit a group of people who contributed to the campaigns of elected officials.
Some diplomats benefit themselves from their duties and establish business relationships in other
countries for their own benefit. Article 146 is clear when it points out that the consequences of
patronage “will result in punishment of the person who provides advantages to partners, family,
close friends, friends or related” (Dominican Constitution, 2011).
One example of how Article 146 is violated is found in the 2013 payroll and the recent
case of the Dominican diplomat in United Nations, Francis Lorenzo, who was arrested and accused
of participating in an international corruption scandal. The scandal involves other diplomats,
including the former president of the General Assembly John Ashe (CNN, 2015). However, the
penalties for the diplomat Francis Lorenzo continue in a limbo. Some Dominican organizations
have demanded that he be ordered to return 100% of his personal wealth to the state. According to
the Dominican activists for the “Country Alliance” in New York, the case of this Dominican
diplomat highlights the importance of establishing the rule of law in the diplomatic and consular
corps, extracting all the officials without functions and designating persons for their merit and
capacity, not for their political militancy (Nuevo Diario, 2015).
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Organic Law 314 and the New Law in 2011
Organic Law 314’s an obsolete law that outlines a traditional form of diplomacy instead of
a new diplomacy. For more than 45 years, the Foreign Ministry was ruled by the same law without
any transformation or revision. The Ministry law has not changed since 1964 and this reveals a
diplomatic stagnation, a limited interest of the executive power to regulate and supervise the law,
and the legal heritage of Balaguer in Dominican politics. Secondly, the proposal of the New
Organic Law bolstered in 2011 was approved by the Chamber of Senators in 2012, but it is still’s
waiting for the support of the Chamber of Deputies. The local newspaper Diario Libre (2015)
reported that even though the chamber approved other important laws, the new Organic Law
remains awaiting approval (Diario Libre, 2015).
If and when it is ratified, the new Organic Law will allow for some improvement. An
example of this is in article 56, which establishes a “Career Council” that will evaluate and dismiss
any diplomats who the council demonstrates as incompetent in the exercise of their functions. The
new law creates the council; however, the old document in article 27 establishes that the expulsion
of a diplomat must be due to ‘serious offenses’. And it remains unclear in both laws who
determines what the severe violations will be, and who will determine when they are committed.
(MIREX, 2016)
Article 56. 1) Abandonment of their duties 2) By Criminal Conviction 3) Incompetence in the
exercise of their functions 4) Qualified deficient in three successive qualifications 5) Proven
inappropriate behavior. Note: The Career Council is who will establish an objective investigation
of the imputed facts (House of Representatives, 2011).

Another problem with this new council is that it does not specify who should carry out the
evaluations. To be effective, different groups of the Dominican society should be involved, not
only politicians. Citizens need to demand a more thorough execution of the law and clarity about
how the government spends its money.
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The Press and Law Foundation requests that the executive impose drastic sanctions against
diplomats who refuse to produce a declaration of assets as mandated by the law, because this
situation affects the image of the country and the government (7 días.com.do, 2015). Bernd Reiter
(2013) argues that the changes in the legal frameworks do not transform social realities, but only
add a promise of change (Reiter, 2013). As Reiter stresses, “weak states are weak because they
lack legitimacy and thus cannot count on the compliance of their citizens, thus making it costly to
enforce the rule of law and order” (Reiter, 2013, p. 184). However, in some of the cases it is not a
lack of resources, but the misuse of the resources for the benefit of political leaders. The next
document that I discuss is an example of how the state’s resources are being used for the interests
of political elites, thereby increasing patronage and corruption. In addition, I analyze how the
presidential candidates forget about laws and leave aside the commitment to implement them.
The Protocol for Transparency and Institutions
The Protocol for Transparency and Institutions is a document in which the current
Dominican president Danilo Medina has pledged to comply with in order to regulate the role of
public officials. Among the various items that make up the Protocol are some articles concerning
diplomatic functions. The document suggests that the regularization of jobs abroad, and the
elimination of job duplications in public administration are presidential priorities. When the
current president Danilo Medina was a presidential candidate in 2012, he signed the “Protocol for
Transparency and Institutions.” He promised to eliminate political clientelism and guarantee a
professional diplomatic corps career; however, the leader failed to remember this once he was in
office. Instead, the new president Medina acted as the previous presidents, and when he won the
elections did not make the promised changes. The new representative of the executive power could
not disarm the historic political patronage that defines the Dominican Foreign Ministry.
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The document signed by the President in 2012 failed in two important ways. The first
failure is regarding measurement 7, which highlights the granting of unnecessary jobs that increase
the national budget (Citizen Participation, 2012)
Measure 7. “To sponsor the elimination of overlapping job responsibilities across the many organs
of public administration, by suppressing the excedent institutions and recurring, when necessary, to
the support of the National Congress for legislative changes required to consolidate bodies that meet
similar functions or overlapping ones and in this way contribute to the eradication of patronage, a
pernicious form of corruption" (Citizen Participation, 2014, 15).

Likewise, Measure 7 stresses clearly that the executive needs to eliminate corruption and
patronage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new President chose to continue exchanging
positions for political commitments.
Another priority that the executive promised in the Protocol was to select a professional
diplomatic corps. Measurement 9 requires that the regularization of jobs abroad have to be a
priority for the executive. (Protocol for Transparency and Institutions, 2012).
Measure 9. Ensure, in the same way, that the Foreign Service of the Dominican Republic will
journey in the way of the professionalization of the diplomatic and consular functions. It will
constitute a priority to support the diplomatic career and the rationalization of the designation
outside” (Citizen Participation, 2014, 15).

According to Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation) the Government has not
fulfilled these measures. The year 2013 was the first year of monitoring the measures and it was
found that 63% of the time the measures were broken, and 27% of the time they were in the
process of being broken. On the other hand, the second assessment shows a setback in the
implementation of the measures, as 77% have not been fulfilled, and only 22% are in the process
of being fulfilled. The first survey reflected that just one measure was accomplished; however, in
the second monitoring none of the measurements were fulfilled completely (Citizen
Participation, 2014)
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Professionalism, Accountability and a New Public Diplomacy
The organization Participación Ciudadana, or “Civil Participation,” emphasizes that in the
country, there is a lack of professionalism in the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Likewise, the organization claims that the Ministry has been characterized by political favoritism
and patronage. In the analysis, the NGO points out that the Dominican Republic will never have a
professional foreign service if the government does not dismantle the culture of exchange votes
for favors (Pimentel, 2014).
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, payrolls in 2013-2014, ministers and
politicians recommended some of the appointed diplomats. These officials had obtained the
positions for past political favors (Acento.com.do, 2014).The consular payroll from 2013-2014
does not present a picture of professionalism in diplomacy. On the contrary, the payroll highlights
that 26% of the officials were recommended by ex-presidents, senators, and deputies from the
current political party (PLD).
In addition, 32% of the diplomats were from the Reformist Political Party (PRSC). This
shows the effects of the strategic alliance between PRSC and PLD. And 30% of the employees
were still recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista. Likewise, 5.93% of the officials are
receiving their money from other government offices, or they do not have a listed salary because
they have not actually occupied the position (Acento.com.do, 2014).
Accountability in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a necessity that can only be realized
with the pressure of the citizens. Ali Farazmand points out that accountability is possible when
public institutions have elements of control and professionalism, because a qualified professional
is concerned with social needs. The author highlights that, “professionalization introduces task
performance, efficiency, effectiveness, objectivity, integrity, identity, and cohesion” (Farazmand,
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1997, p. 309). The weakness in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been a lack of professionalism;
however, the efforts to make the institution more professional clash with the actions of the political
authorities.
The Dominican Republic is not the only country in Latin America to confront this problem.
Mexico also has difficulties. The diplomat Enrique Hubbard Urrea stresses that career diplomats
confront a lot of bureaucracy in order to receive a position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Mexico. A professional has to fill out an application, which is then analyzed by an official,
followed by the Foreign Minister. However, those who have political connections do not fill out
an application at all (Urrea, 2012).
Accountability seems to be a hard political commitment to achieve. Farazman suggests
different approaches to developing accountability in order to obtain a more credible public service
corps. He points to various approaches of “managerial-organizational,” where the institutions
need to be well organized with clear definitions of the functions of each position. In this type of
approach, every official has to understand the responsibilities of everyone and follow the
organizational system (Farazmand, 1997).
The second approach he introduces is called “political means,” which highlights the
legislative oversight, budgetary control, and rotation in office to reduce the risk of
misrepresentation of public interest, amassment of power. Also important are representation and
public participation, whistleblowing, sunshine laws, and an effective organizational and
managerial approach. The third approach that the author advocates is the “legal path,” which helps
to protect the constitutional rights of every citizen. Likewise, Farazman concludes that the cultural
approach uses the element of ethics as a valuable form of education through academic, religious
or secular entities to promote consciousness (Farazmand, 1997, p. 303). However, these forms of
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accountability are difficult to apply when a country does not implement the laws and has higher
levels of patronage and corruption that are deeply rooted in political culture.
On the other hand, some academics call attention to the Foreign Ministries around the
world and explain that only a small group trains their personal candidates to be players in the
transnational network. However, the new structure of diplomacy is not to serve as a cultural agent.
An agent of diplomacy should not focus solely on signing economic contracts as the Dominican
Republic has been doing. As stated by Melissen, the role of diplomacy

… is not only ‘art’ and ‘culture, but also communicating a country’s thinking, research, journalism
and national debate. In this perspective, the traditional areas of cultural exchange become part of a
new type of international communication and the growth of public diplomacy becomes a reaction
to the close connection between cultural, press and information activities as a result of new social,
economic and political realities (Melissen, 2005).

Experts in international relations suggest that the new form of diplomacy need not only have an
integration between the civil societies in other countries, but that the embassies should contain
experts in foreign relations that go beyond political patronage, as well.
Diplomacy has changed over the years and it is important that a country formulates national
politics, communicates ideas, and listen the foreign publics to control these changes. Before a
Foreign Ministry can begin a training process, it needs to address issues of corruption and
patronage within the organization. In that sense, the use of diplomacy for personal purposes in
some countries has been criticized by many academics.

Conclusion
I explained in this chapter how patronage, corruption and the gap between laws and reality
affect the Dominican Republic’s foreign policy. I also point out that in order to develop a New
Public Diplomacy, the Dominican Republic needs to listen to foreign publics. By examining of the
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the country, I highlighted the characteristics of patronage between
the current government and political parties. I evaluated the history of patronage in the institution
and how these elements disturb the relationship between the Dominican Republic and external
publics. Another complication is the corruption in the Payrolls of the Ministry in 2013 and 2015,
where a diplomat in the U.S earned more money than the U.S. president. I also presented some
statistics that placed the Dominican Republic as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
I also evaluated how these public officials are breaking the laws of the country with
impunity. Even though these laws stressed that there needs to be a “limited and necessary" group
of people in the diplomatic corps, media and public opinion show that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs is an institution full of ‘empty bottles,’ and the country has more people in the diplomatic
corps than other countries which have much larger populations such as Mexico, Argentina and
Brazil. Diplomats break the laws without e regulation or accountability.
I also evaluated some legal documents such as the Dominican Constitution, the Organic
Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Protocol of Transparency and Institution. I
evaluated that there are some problems in the enforcement of the 314 Organic Law of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. First, I discovered that the Ministry has been governed by an obsolete law since
1964, and even though some political elites proposed a new one in 2011, the Chamber of Senators
has yet to approve it. This implies a delay in the creation of a new framework for public diplomacy
in the Dominican Republic. However, it is not only a diplomatic stock with other countries in the
field of trade and cultural exchange, but also an institutional stagnation, which has not allowed the
Dominican Republic to handle diplomacy professionally. Likewise, the institution has many
diplomats who are not exercising their jobs abroad. This implies that the country has high levels
of corruption and political clientelism.
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The old Law 314 specifies sanctions for diplomats who are not exercising their jobs;
however, the new law created in 2011 puts the emphasis on dismissal of any diplomats who are
violating this law. Making a comparative analysis between the two laws, I found that the new one
does not offer much guidance on how the law is going to sanction those in violation. However, the
new law has some improvements in terms of regulations to evaluate the role of diplomats overseas
like the Diplomatic and Consular Council, even though, it is not clear who the actors are that are
going to be involved in the Council. Despite the fact that the Ministry has experienced small
improvements, it continues to face widespread corruption and political clientelism.
I also evaluated the Dominican Constitution, specifically Article 146, and the Dominican
Republic Protocol of Transparency and Institutions (Johnson and Reynolds, 2008). In these
documents it can be seen that the Dominican Republic has clear positions about the importance of
transparency in institutions, and the law condemns any act of corruption. However, I also presented
evidence to illustrate how the government violates the law as do the citizens.
I argue that one of the main reasons for this gap between law and reality is rooted in the
time of the former president, Joaquín Balaguer. Balaguer actually claimed that the constitution was
“just a piece of paper”. Despite the many problems with his regime, the majority of the Dominicans
saw his 22 years in power as the standard way of doing democracy in the Dominican Republic.
The legacy of Balaguer’s ideologies framed how Dominicans perceive the law. The common
attitude about breaking laws is not only evident in the state, but also in different levels of the
society, where citizens also violate laws with impunity. Nevertheless, I state the importance of
citizen participation to be more active in disarming patronage, corruption and the breaking of laws.
In order to acquire a new concept of public diplomacy, the Dominican government and its citizens
must leave behind the nationalist discourse and listen to international public opinion.
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CHAPTER IV
The Role of Government, Citizens and International Publics
Conclusion
This thesis explains that Dominican diplomacy faces internal challenges in developing a
new framework for foreign affairs. This thesis demonstrates that soft power has not been achieved
by the Dominican government, in spite of the fact that the country has cultural programs around
the world. Soft power and the new concept of public diplomacy can only be achieved by an
integrated strategy that includes: the government, local citizens and international public opinion.
This research explains the reasons behind the Dominican Republic’s failing diplomacy. I
defined three problems in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that reinforce this inheritance: patronage,
corruption and legal idealism. I described how the weakness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
leads to disrepute. In my interview with Mu Kien Sang, she described the complications in
Dominican diplomacy. Likewise, other academics have denounced corruption and political
clientelism in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. International and domestic public opinion not only
reveals the institutional weakness of the Ministry, but also provided an internal discussion in
academia about the current state of Dominican diplomacy.
Furthermore, I evaluated different variables such as patronage, corruption and legal
idealism in several important documents pertaining to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Patronage
is demonstrated through the exploration of the alliance formed by the Reformist Political Party
and the Liberation party, which led the first to take control of the Ministry. According to the
document, “Political Culture of Democracy in the Dominican Republic, 2014” conducted by the
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United States Agency for International Development, the Latin American Public Opinion
(LAPOP), and Americas Barometer, 37.1% of Dominicans expressed that they received a
patronage offer during campaign elections. The D.R. has higher levels of political clientelism than
Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela.
The 2013 Ministry payroll highlights that political clientelism and corruption are part of
how the government is conducting diplomacy. Next to each official name on the 2013 payroll there
is also a description of who that person is and by whom they were recommended. The documents
highlight a large number of people from the Reformist Party and a large group of people personally
recommended by Senator Felix Bautista, who is accused of high levels of corruption by
Transparency International (Transparency International, 2016). Another case of corruption is the
Ambassador to Spain, Cesar Medina, who earned $ 40,000 USD per month, more than the base
salary of the United States president. The 2015 payrolls published by the Dominican Ministry of
Foreign Affairs still contain many irregularities, even though the government reduced the salaries
drastically (MIREX, 2015). Additionally, the Dominican Republic has more permanent officials
in the Blue Book of United Nations than any other nation in the region. A survey by USAID in
2008 found a gap between corruption in institutions and victims of corruption in the country. Only
16.3 % of the people in the survey reported they were victims of corruption, in contrast to the 45.9
% who declared corruption in the state. The survey implies that many people who are guilty of
bribery do not categorize themselves as corrupt (Morgan, et al., 2010).
The third variable that I tested is the theory of law and reality. To do this, I assessed three
main documents. The documents are the Dominican Constitution specifically article 149; the
Organic Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is from 1964; and the Dominican Republic
Protocol of Transparency and Institutions. Article 149 condemns any type of corruption by state
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officials; however, impunity remains the norm in the Dominican state. In these documents, it can
be seen that the Dominican Republic has clear legal positions about the importance of transparency
and condemns any act of corruption. The Protocol of Transparency highlights that measurements
7 and 9, which concern the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a diplomatic career, are not fully
completed by the president. This confirms that there is a difference between the reality that the
country is experiencing and the legal requirements.
Policy Implications
This study reflects how the weakness in the Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs implies
concrete problems for the exercise of diplomacy as well as for democracy. The lack of compliance
with the laws, the shortcomings of the executive and the unwillingness of civil society to demand
accountability from the government in the face of patronage, corruption and the absence of rule of
law have provoked a diplomatic calamity. The Ministry has been ruled a patronage system with
an obsolete law. The Organic Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created from 1964,
during the Trujillo dictatorship. The Dominican government never changed its foreign policy even
though the country has undergone a democratic transition. Only an active citizen movement can
provoke changes.
Even though the Dominican state has made some changes in 2015, the data that I present
can be used for further policy changes. Furthermore, my study indicates that citizen participation
is vital for change to happen. Jurgen Habermas (1996) argues that in order to solve the problem of
rule of law in modern societies, states need social integration to have a better application of
democracy. Habermas explains that modern law framed subjective laws that do not consider the
demands of the society. Moreover, Habermas proposed a discursive theory to alleviate the existing
problems between facts and norms. Habermas stresses the important role of public discourse in
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democratic institutions (Habermas, 1996). However, in order to have citizen participation,
individuals need to know the difference between rights and duties.
In the case of Dominican Republic, social integration has shown some improvements in
the past years; however, there is still a long way to go to achieve citizen participation. Even though
there are many social movements who protest against the system, I identify two problems in
Dominican society. The first obstacle is the pessimistic social atmosphere where citizens do not
want to be involved in political and social change because they consider protesting to be an
ineffective way to influence corrupt politicians. Carmen Beatriz Ruíz (2007) points out that
countries lose legitimacy when citizens lose confidence in the lawmakers. Ruíz stresses that there
is a “... huge gap between discourse and practice; the imbalance between rights and duties; the
authoritarian practice of viewing civic processes as homogenizing initiatives” (Tulchin &
Ruthenberg, 2007, p. 213). Ruíz suggests that to recover laws and institutions, countries must
develop social networks to integrate different sectors of the society to control and monitor public
institutions (Tulchin & Ruthenberg, 2007).
Countries that achieve an integration between the state, citizens and international
constituencies could achieve successful soft power. These kinds of regimes change the traditional
paradigms of diplomacy. The international accusations triggered a nationalist discourse between
citizens. Rather than leveraging this opportunity, the Dominican government used this discourse
to distract attention away from the weaknesses of the state. If the country does not change its policy
towards diplomacy and continues maintaining the system of patronage, corruption, and elite
control, the diplomatic image of the country will not improve.
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Possible Future Research
The Dominican Republic has not been studied much in terms of foreign affairs. The
Dominican Republic has strong foreign relations with the United States. G. Pope Atkins and
Larman Cutis (1998) explain that the U.S relationship with the Dominican Republic involves many
features including;
establishing receiverships and forming banking consortia; landing troops and
organizing militarily occupations; recognizing or refusing new governments;
granting or refusing to provide foreign assistance (economic, military, and
technical);supervising elections; supporting dictators; and promoting democracy
and development (Atkins & Wilson, 1998, p. 1).
The bilateral relations that these countries have developed over the years are highly debated
in academia. In this thesis, I hope to transform the discourse of traditional (mostly bi-lateral)
diplomacy that only involves interventions, economic treaties and cultural exchanges by
introducing the new concept of public diplomacy and soft power to the analysis of the Dominican
Republic. Nevertheless, this research measures the relationship between diplomacy and the
institutions of diplomacy, and there are other topics that could add significantly to this research.
Race and diplomacy in the Dominican Republic is an important aspect to be analyzed, due
to the human rights violations and the proximity with Haiti. The document of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs “Arquitectura Diplomática” emphasizes the aspect of race and the creation of
programs; however, it doesn’t point out how these development programs can be accountable. As
I point out in this study, accountability and credibility are important to achieving soft power.
Another area for future research could be how Dominicans can achieve soft power and
structure new forms of accountability in diplomacy. Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico have been
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able to achieve a form of cultural impact around the world. Craig Hayden presents evidence about
how Venezuela promotes soft power through the manipulation of the media with the political
participation on television and a socialist discourse with a “counter hegemonic” ideology. Hayden
highlights that Venezuela conceived its foreign policies with the assumptions that a mediated
communication can impact other countries and awake the vulnerability of international publics.
Moreover, these soft power discourses have many implications for the economic relations
with other countries and private industry. Venezuela has had a strong influence over the Latin
American region with the provision of oil and the formation of strategic alliances (Hayden, 2012).
Another example of soft power is how Japan projects itself as a peaceful country and tries to bury
the historical legacy of World War II. Craig Hayden (2012) analyses the Japanese strategy of soft
power with the establishment of some programs around the world such as cultural diplomacy,
international broadcasting services, and development aid and investment. These examples of soft
power can serve as examples to the Dominican Republic in pursuing its own diplomatic strategies.
I believe that in the case of Dominican Republic a better form of soft power is not best
pursued through these kinds of cultural activities or broadcasting services, but rather I think the
nation should focus on two points: institutional credibility and human rights. However, as I
pointed out earlier, these goals are dependent on a strong integration between the Dominican
government, citizens and international publics.
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Appendix B: Official List of the identified Diplomats in the Dominican Consulates in 2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014).The author
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DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETO
CONSULADO
NOMBRES

RANGO

DOTACIO
N

DECRETO

ALAMEDA - SAN FRANCISCO
CALIFORNIA , EE.UU.
CELESTE
1
FRANCISCA JIMENEZ
CONSUL
AMSTERDAM- HOLLANDA-REINO DE
LOS PAISES BAJOS
EDUARDO
2
HERNANDEZ PEREZ

23,000.00
DECRET. NO. 631-08 DEL 13-10-08/ HERMANA RADHAMES JIMENEZ

VICECONSUL

4,800.00
DECRET. NO.1317-04/ PRESIDENTE DEL PLD EN HOLANDA

CHRISTOPHER
3
LUIS HIDALGO JIMENEZ
AUXILIAR

1,800.00
DECRET. NO 559-07/ HIJO BERTHA JIMENEZ-PINA RORIBIO

ARUBA
JOSELYNE
4
ROSARIO ROMERO

CONSUL GENERAL

LEONY
5 ESMERALDA CROES

VICECONSUL

16,190.00
DECRET. NO. 526-08 DEL 10/09/08 / ESPOSA RAFAEL NUNEZ
DECRET. NO. 196-11 DEL 24-03-11 / DANILO PEREZ-LEONEL
5,000.00
FERNANDEZ

ANTIGUA Y BARBUDAS
VICECONSUL

DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ADRIANO HERRERA/ COMISION PLD7,000.00
NEW YORK

JOSE7TOMAS PEREZ GAUTREAUX VICECONSUL

DECRET. NO. 533-07/ HIJO DE TAINA GAUTREAUX Y DE JOSE TOMAS
4,300.00
PEREZ

VICENTE
8
ALFONSO BENGOA ARAGUIZ
AUXILIAR

6,300.00
DECRET NO. 113-09/ HIJO DE VICENTE BENGOA

NELSON
6 MELITON PIMENTEL
BARCELONA- ESPAÑA
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GRACE
9 BIDO CAMILO

DECRET NO. 604-08 DEL 30-09-08/ HIJA DRA. CAMILO/ MARGARITA
3,100.00
CEDEÑO

AUXILIAR

DEYMI
10 MERCEDES ABREU CAMPUSANO
AUXLIAR
BOSTON, MASSACHUSSETS,-ESTADOS
UNIDOS

2,100.00
DECRET. NO. 135-12 DEL 22-03-12 / GENERAL CAMPUSANO/ PALACIO

LUDOVINO
11
HERRERA CABRAL

3,975.00
DECRET. NO.220-06/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA

VICECONSUL

FRANKIE
12
ALEXANDER FRIAS MOLINA
VICECONSUL

5,800.00
DECRET. NO. 188-12 DEL 17-04-12/ CONSULTORIA JURIDICA

XIOMARA
13
ROCHET BRITO

6,850.00
DECRET. NO. 591-10/ EX -ASISTENTE JURIDICO PALACIO
DECRET. NO.1393-04/HIJA DEL EMBAJADOR JOSE SOSA4,000.00
ALEJANDRINA GERMAN

VICECONSUL

YESSICA
14
ALEJANDRINA SOSA GERMAN
AUXILIAR
BOGOTA- COLOMBIA

DECRET. NO. 664-08 DEL 21-10-08. / HIJO DEL CONSUL Y PRIMO
5,550.00
PTE.LEONEL FERNANDEZ

JUAN
15CARLOS MARTINEZ FERNANDEZ
VICECONSUL
CARACAS-VENEZUELA
LUIS16ALBERTO GUERRA

VICECONSUL

3,975.00
DECRET. NO. 456-11 DEL 03-08-11/MARIA KASSE

CURAZAO- ANTILLA HOLANDESAS
CARMEN
17
VIRGINIA CARDONA
CONSUL GENERAL
EVELYN ALTAGRACIA PERALTA
LIRIANO
18
VICECONSUL
DARIA
19 LISA BENGOA SORIANO

10,300.00
DECRET. NO. 413-08 DEL 29/08/08/ HIJA DE DOÑA LIGIA MELO
5,100.00
DECRET. NO. 135-12 DEL 22-03-12 /DAMARIS-DON ABEL

VICECONSUL

7,300.00
DECRET. NO.386-10 DEL 29-07-10/ VICENTE BENGOA

CHICAGO-ILIINOIS, ESTADOS UNIDOS
LETTY
20 PATRICIA RIVERA TORRES VICECONSUL

4,800.00
DECRET. NO. 520-08 DEL 10-09-08/ HIJA SR. RIVERA- INDUVECA

FRANKFURT-ALEMANIA
DECRET. NO.137-12 DEL 22-03-12/ HIJO DEL CONSUL CESAR
3,975.00
ANTONIO JIMENEZ

CESAR
21 FERNANDO JIMENEZ CORDOVA
VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURT
GENOVA-ITALIA
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INGRID
22 MARIENA ABUD REYNOSOVICECONSUL
GUADALUPE, DEPARTAMENTO
FRANCES DE ULTRAMAR
ANDREA ALTAGRACIA MEDINA
RODRIGUEZ
23
CONSUL GENERAL
ANGELA
24
ROSA ROSADO ARIAS
JAVIER AUGUSTO CUEVAS
FONTANILLA
25

DECRET. NO. 301-11 DEL 12-05-11/ HIJA DE LA EX- EMBAJADORA ANA
3,975.00
SILVIA REYNOSO

16,300.00
DECRET. NO. 346-11 DEL 02-06-11/ PRIMA PTE. DANILO MEDINA

VICECONSUL
AUXILIAR

3,975.00
DECRET. NO. 346-11 DEL 02-06-11/ CONSUL ANDREA MEDINA
DECRET. NO. 261-12 DEL 22-05-12/ ESCOLTA CAMPAÑA DE PTE.
2,100.00
DANILO MEDINA

AUXILIAR

4,100.00
DECRET NO. 675-10/ EURI CABRAL-PERIODISTA

HAMBURGO- ALEMANIA
JULIO
26 CESAR GARABOT
JAMAICA, KINGSTON
FRANCISCO
27
RAFAEL SANTANA POLO
VICECONSUL

5,300.00
DECRET NO. 160-11/ FELIX VASQUEZ- SENADOR
DECRET. NO. 409-11 DEL 04-07-11/ SOBRINA PTE. LEONEL
5,300.00
FERNANDEZ

CAROLINA
28
E. LUGO FERNANDEZ VICECONSUL
JUANA MENDEZ- HAITI
RAFAEL
29 TOMAS CALDERON MAUSIAN
VICECONSUL

4,800.00
DECRET. NO. 698-08 DEL 27-10-08, CONSUL EUNICE JIMENO

RAMON
30 LEONEL PEREZ SANCHEZ VICECONSUL

5,975.00
DECRET NO. 580-05/ HIJO DE JUANA SANCHEZ

MARLENNE
31
ELAINE MORA DE NUÑEZ
VICECONSUL

5,300.00
DECRET. NO.724-11 DEL 26-11-11/ DON ABEL

MADRID-ESPAÑA
ANA32ROCIO ESCOTO HERNANDEZ VICEONSUL
VICECONSUL PARA IMPLEMENTACION DEL
MILDRY
33 YOCASTA FELIZ
SISTEMA D GESTION CONSULAR

6,000.00
DECRET. NO. 620-11 DEL 14-10-11/ HIJA DE MAYOBANEX
5,800.00
DECRET. NO.115-11 DEL 3-03-11 / MARCOS CROSS

OLMEDO
34
DE JESUS PINEDA FELIZ AUXILIAR, ENC. DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE PRENSA
3,100.00
DECRET. NO. 334-09 DEL 28/04/2009/ MELTON PINEDA
FILDA
35 BONETTI

AUXILIAR

4,600.00
DECRET. NO. 223-11 DEL 13-04-11/ LUIS MANUEL BONETTI

IGNACIO
36
A. BENGOA ARAGUIS

AUXILIAR

4,220.00
DECRET. NO. 496-05/ HIJO DE VICENTE BENGOA

73

ABRIL
37 MORA GARCIA

AUXILIAR

DECRET. NO. 284-07/ HIJA DE JORGE SEVERINO (MINISTRO
4,370.00
PRESIDENCIA)

VICECONSUL EN ISLAS CANARIAS

4,300.00
DECRET. NO.617-10 DEL 06-11-10/ MARCOS CROSS

ISLAS CANARIAS- ESPAÑA
CLEMENTE
38
SANTOS MERCEDES

MARIA
39 IVELISSE ALONZO LA PAZ AUXILIAR EN ISLAS CANARIAS

2,300.00
DECRET. NO.617-10 DEL 06-11-10/ MARCOS CROSS

MARSELLA - FRANCIA
GLORIA ALTAGRACIA PEGUERO
MENDEZ
40

VICECONSUL

5,300.00
DECRET. NO. 455-07/ HERMANA HECTOR PEGUERO MENDEZ

MIGUELINA
41
RIVERA

VICECONSUL

3,975.00
DECRET. NO. 45-11 DEL 08-02-11/ LAURA FAXAS

MILAN-ITALIA
TEODORO
42
APONTE DISLA

DECRET NO. 658-05/ ESPOSO MERCEDES BRITO/ CONSUL DE
6,000.00
GENOVA
DECRET. NO. 223-11 DEL 13-04-11/ HERMANO GERENAL PUIG
4,300.00
(AVANZADA)

VICECONSUL

CARLING
43
MANUEL PUIG HERNANDEZ
AUXILIAR
MAYAGUEZ- PUERTO RICO ESTADOS
UNIDOS
JOSE44STEFAN BOSCH

CONSUL

15,300.00
DECRET. NO. 779-09 DEL 21-10-09/ NIETO DE JUAN BOSCH

INDIANA
45
ISABEL JIMENEZ BOSCH VICECONSUL

5,300.00
DECRET NO. 1386-04/ NIETA DE JUAN BOSCH

LUISA
46 ELENA RAMIREZ SANTANA VICECONSUL

6,300.00
DECRET NO. 375-09/ RAFAEL ALBURQUERQUE

LISSELOTTE
47
FERNANDEZ BAEZ

7,800.00
DECRET NO. 266-10/ SOBRINA PTE. LEONEL FERNANDEZ

VICECONSUL

MONTREAL - CANADA
LUISA
48 VIOLETA SANTANA JIMENEZ
VICECONSUL EN MONTREAL

7,500.00
DECRET. NO.97-10 DEL 03-08-10 / LUIS MANUEL BONETTI

FRANK
49 CARLOS CABRAL GARCIA VICECONSUL

4,300.00
DECRET. NO. 727-08 DEL 29-10-08 HIJO FRANK CABRAL
DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ ESPOSA PAULINO- CHOFER PTE.
4,800.00
FERNANDEZ/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK

ANGELIN
50
ESPERANZA MINIER

AUXILIAR

CYNTHIA
51
MARIE RODRIGUEZ BUSTO
AUXILIAR

3,320.00
DECRET. NO. 322-07/ HIJA ASISTENTE FRANCISCO JAVIER
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MIAMI, FLORIDA, ESTADOS UNIDOS
DE AMERICA
JANET
52 LEE BLANDINO CASTILLO VICECONSUL

DECRET. NO. 754-08 DEL 17-11-08/ ESPOSA PROCURADOR RADHAMES
9,800.00
JIMENEZ

MARIA
53 ERNESTINA PEÑA SURIEL VICECONSUL

5,900.00
DECRET. NO. 69-09/ LUIS MANUEL BONETTI

MARIA
54 ROSA ZELLER BARROUS AUXILIAR/HONORIFICA
ELIZABETH DEL C. DE JESUS LORA
LITHGOW
55
AUXILIAR

DECRET. NO. 220-08/ LUIS MANUEL BONETTI

BELKIS
56 BLANDINO

AUXILIAR

2,100.00
DECRET. NO.223-11/ DON ABEL
DECRET. NO. 762-08 DEL 24-11-08 /PROCURADOR RADHAMES
2,100.00
JIMENEZ

LUIS57MANUEL HERRERA

AUXILIAR

5,420.00
DECRET. NO. 486-06/ ADRIANO HERRERA

NEW ORLEANS--ESTADOS UNIDOS
LISSETTE
58
JOSEFINA MARTINEZ MUÑIZ
VICECONSUL
FEDERICO AUGUSTO ANTUN
HERNANDEZ
59
VICECONSUL

8,850.00
DECRET. NO. 113-09 DEL 14-02-09/ ESPOSA JOEL LANTIGUA

ELOISA
60 SOSA CAMPUSANO

4,900.00
DECRET. NO. 222-11 DEL 13-04-11/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA/DON ABEL

7,300.00
DECRET. NO 256-11 DEL 25-04-11/ HIJO QUIQUE ANTUN

VICECONSUL

NEW YORK--ESTADOS UNIDOS
LUIS61FERNANDO RODRIGUEZ SANTOS
AUXILIAR

4,100.00
DECRET. NO. 675-10 DEL 01-12-10 / EURI CABRAL

NORMA
62 ROSA CAMPUSANO

CARMEN
63
OLGA CASTILLO BURGOSAUXILIAR

4,500.00
DECRET. NO. 134-110 DEL 08-03-11/ GRAL. CAMPUSANO (PALACIO)
DECRET. NO. 760-08 DEL 24-11-08/HERMANA OSCAR CASTILLO/
2,100.00
ASIST. PTE. FERNANDEZ

MEXICO D.F
ARIADNA DEL CARMEN VASQUEZ VICECONSUL
GERMAN
64

5,900.00
DECRET. NO. 500-05/ ALEJANDRINA GERMAN

AUXILIAR

REPUBLICA CHECA--RUSIA
REYNA
65 CAMACHO DE COHEN

VICECONSUL

5,300.00
DECRET. NO. 174-11 DEL 18-03-11/ MADRE DE MICHEL COHEN

RIO DE JANEIRO--BRASIL
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ENRIQUILLO
66
CLIME RIVERA

DECRET. NO. 532-09 DEL 24-07-09/ HIJO EMBAJADOR END. ASUNTOS
6,100.00
DEL CARIBE

VICECONSUL

PANAMA--PANAMA
LLUDMILA
67
DESIREE PUJOLS

VICECONSUL

CAMILO
68 BERMUDEZ

VICECONSUL

DECRET. NO. 34-09 DEL 17-01-09/ ESPOSA ALBERTO PEÑA *EX
5,000.00
SECRETARIA TEMO.
TRASLAD. ADMSMIAMI. OFIC. NO.8907 DEL 17-09-09 HERMANO
7,500.00
MICALO BERMUDEZ

YASMIN
69 MATOS ACOSTA

VICECONSUL

7,800.00
DECRET. NO.637-10 DEL 15-11-10/ VICTOR SANCHEZ

CARMEN
70
MILADY SANCHEZ ROSARIO
AUXILIAR

5,200.00
DECRET.NO.785-09 DEL 26-10-09 / HERMANA VICTOR SANCHEZ

JESUS
71 ANDRES SOLIS NOVAS

5,100.00
DECRET. NO. 223-11 DEL 13-04-11/ VICTOR SANCHEZ

AUXILIAR

PUERTO PRINCIPE - HAITI
DECRET. NO. 176-11 DEL 18-03-11/ EX-DIR. COM. ZONAS
6,000.00
FRONTERIZAS/ AGREGADO

NILDO
72 CESAR DE LOS SANTOS SOLIS
VICECONSUL
SAN JUAN- PUERTO RICO--ESTADOS
UNIDOS
MILEDYS
73
MIOSOTIS ARIAS

VICECONSUL

CAMBIO DESIGNACION DECRET. NO.501-10 DEL 31-08-10/ MIGUEL
7,200.00
MEJIA

DEBRESKA
74
DE LEON SANTIAGO

AUXILIAR CONSULAR

2,100.00
DECRE. NO. 617-11 EL 14-10-11 / DAMARIS/ DON ABEL

MARISEL
75
LISTER VILLAVIZAR

AUXILIAR CONSULAR

5,716.00
DECRET. NO. 724-08 DEL 29-10-08/ OCTAVIO LISTER- EMB. PANAMA

SAO PAULO- BRASIL
ALCIBIADES
76
GEOMAR GARCIA ROJAS
CONSUL
FRANCIA CONCEPCION MARTINEZ
DRULLARD
77
VICECONSUL

16,300.00
DECRET. NO,.675-10 DEL 1-12-10/ PERIODISTA
7,600.00
DECRET. NO. 71-05/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA

RUTH
78 SILVANA HERRERA PLACENCIA
AUXILIAR
SAN MARTEEN--ANTILLAS
HOLANDESA

3,420.00
/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA

RAMONA
79
AURORA MARTI MACEO VICECONSUL

3,975.00
DECRET. NO.254-11 DEL 25-04-11 / ARISTIPO VIDAL

FLAVIA
80 VIRGINIA ROJO VIDAL

3,975.00
DECRET. NO.254-11 DEL 25-04-11/ ARISTIPO VIDAL

VICECONSUL
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SEVILLA- ESPAÑA
ALEJANDRA
81
GUTIERREZ DIAZ

CONSUL GENERAL

ELIAS
82 AHMED SERULLE AYBAR

AUXILIAR

14,000.00
DECRET NO. 54-08 DEL 18-09-08/ HIJA EUCLIDES GUTIERREZ
4,800.00
DECRET. NO.499-11 DEL 19-08-11/ HIJO ELIAS SERRULLE

VALENCIA - ESPAÑA
DANILDA EVELYN DE LOS SANTOS
RODRIGUEZ
83
VICECONSUL

5,300.00
DECRET. NO. 134-11 DEL 08-03-11/ HERMANA NILDO DE LOS SANTOS

LEONOR
84 DE LA CRUZ

AUXILIAR

2,100.00
DECRET. NO. 181-09 DEL 10-03-09/ F. GARCIA VALENTIN

VICECONSUL

5,100.00
DECRET. NO. 514-08 DEL 10-09-08 / PRIMO DE CRISPIN

ZURICH - SUIZA
CRUGELL
85
MARIANO ZORRILLA
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Appendix D. List of the Dominican Foreign Service (Citizen Participation, 2014).

PAÍS
Alemania
Antigua Barbuda
Antillas
Holandesas
Argentina
Aruba
Austria
Bélgica
Brasil
Canadá
Chile
China
Colombia
Corea
Costa Rica
Cuba
Curazao
Ecuador
PAÍS
Egipto
El Salvador
Emiratos Árabes
España
Estados Unidos
Francia
Grecia
Guatemala
Honduras
India
Inglaterra
Italia
Irán

CONSULAD
O 1
51
01
41
09
1
28
56
5
1
0-

EMBAJADA
1
62
01
51
42
35
42
01
22
64
2
62
41
9

CONSULADO
1
9
12
1
946
1
1
6-

EMBAJADA
7
1
02
2
83
31
01
91
89
1
53
32
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TOTAL
31
10
14
20
10
15
23
43
59
20
12
32
4
26
29
10
19
TOTAL
7
10
3
119
247
29
6
19
19
9
15
49
2

Israel
Jamaica
Japón
Marruecos
México
Nicaragua
Panamá
Paraguay
Perú
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
República Checa
República
Sudáfrica
Rusia
Suecia
Suiza
Trinidad y Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
SUBTOTAL
FAO
Misión Austria
OEA
Suiza
ONU
UNESCO
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL

11
6
5
2
44
23
6
1
05
7
7

5
2
01
06
2
1
83
49
1
23
12
4
1
62
6
1
16
82
2
684
5
3
4
31
7
76
1
83
51
9

577

80

5
31
16
6
26
18
58
9
13
21
42
2
3
4
12
6
12
16
18
32
1261
5
3
43
1
77
6
135
1396

Appendix E: Official List of Staff recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista in 2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014). Note: the
Author of this Research only Removed the Diplomats ID Numbers and Photos.

CONSULADOS RECOMENDADOS
POR FELIX
BAUTISTA
NOMBRE

RANGO/PAIS

1

RAMON EMILIO REYES

AUXILIAR EN RIO DE JANEIROBRASIL

2

MELVI TRINIDAD

AUXILIAR EN RIO DE JANEIROBRASIL

3

JUAN BAUTISTA ALONZO DE LA CRUZ

AUXILIAR EN AMBERES, BELGICA

4

DAMIAN MEDINA

AUXILIAR- EN ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA

5

JUAN ANTONIO HERNANDEZ PICHARDO

AUXILIAR- EN ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA

6

RAMON HERIBERTO PICHARDO

AUXILIAR EN ATENAS-GRECIA

7

GERALDO DE JESUS GUZMAN

AUXILIAR EN ATENAS-GRECIA

8

ABIGAIR RODRIGUEZ

AUXILIAR EN BELLADERE-HAITI

9

CARLOS JOSE ESTEVEZ SANTELISES

AUXILIAR EN BELLADERE-HAITI
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OBSERVACION
DECRET. NO. 6-9/ COMISION PLD-NEW
YORK
Traslasd desde Ny.COMISION PLD-NEW
YORK
DECRET. NO.182-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION
PLD- NEW YORK
DECRET. NO.4-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK
DECRET. NO.182-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK
DECRET. NO.8-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK
DECRET. NO.8-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK

DECRET. 662-08 DEL 21/10/08/

10

ANA GUILLERMINA NUÑEZ

AUXILIAR EN BOSTON

FELIX

BAUTISTA
DECRET NO.182-09 DEL10-03-09/ COMISION

11

NEW YORK

MARTA JULIA DE PEÑA ROBLES

AUXILIAR EN CURAZAO

TOMAS GUZMAN RAMIREZ

AUXILIAR- EN HAMBURGOALEMANIA

NEW YORK
ESPOSA PAULINOCHOFER PTE. FERNANDEZ/ COMISION
PLD-NY

DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

12

PLDPLD-

DECRET. NO. 6-09

13

ANGELIN ESPERANZA MINIER

AUXILIAR EN MONTREAL-CANADA

14

REBECA MEDINA

AUXILIAR EN MONTREAL-CANADA

15

RODOLFO FURGENCIO

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK
TRASLADADO ADMS.. 9715 DEL 13-04-10/

16

RAMON ALFONSO RODRIGUEZ

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

17

FELIX MANUEL LEDESMA MELO

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

18

RAMON ELADIO FERNANDEZ

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

19

NOEMI MORENO

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

20

OSCAR MEREJO

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

21

RAFAEL ANTONIO SANCHEZ VILLANUEVA

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

22

RICARDO ANTONIO DE JESUS
BURROUGHS BATISTA

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK
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COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO.4-9 COMISION PLD-NEW
YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK

DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/

23

JUAN ALEXIS HERNANDEZ SANTANA

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

COMISION

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

24

EDWIN ABREU

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

25

APOLINAR RONDON

26

RAFAEL MARCELINO RODRIGUEZ
MARTINEZ

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/

27

JUAN ANTONIO ALBA MARTE

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/

28

MANUEL SUERO

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

COMISION
COMISION

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

29

FRANCISCO A. FERNANDEZ

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

30

ARMANDO MELO

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

31

VICTOR RIVERA

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

32

AGAPITA PEREZ

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

33

RITA M. ESTRELLA DE CONIL

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/

34

HECTOR TRONCOSO

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

COMISION

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

35

ALFONSO POY

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK
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PLD-NEW YORK

DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

36

MARIA DE LOS ANGELES MAÑON

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION

37

XIOMARA PAYANO

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION

38

JOSEFINA JIMENEZ

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION

39

FELIPE FELIZ

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 /COMISION

40

FRANCISCO SOLER

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
.DECRET. NO. 182-09 DEL 10-03-09 / /

41

YAZMIR ALTAGRACIA PUJOLS CASTILLO

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

42

ANDREA JACQUELINE PERALTA ROJAS DE
MEJIA

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

43

FRANCISCA GRISELDA BATISTA

AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK

44

ELIA GARIN RIVERA ALVAREZ

AUXILIAR EN SEVILLA- ESPAÑA

45

NELSON COLLADO

AUXILIAR EN TOKYO-JAPON

46

LOURDES FERNANDEZ

AUXILIAR-MARSELLA-FRANCIA

COMISION

PLD-NEW YORK
PROCESO DE PENSION- COMISION
PLD-NY
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK
DECRET. NO.3-09 DEL 07-01-09/ FELIX
BAUTISTA
DECRET. NO.8-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 4-09 DEL 07-01-09// COMISION PLDNEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 495-11 DEL 19-08-11 SUST. A FRANK

47

FREDDY B. GARCIA PEÑA

CONSUL EN VALENCIA

48

IRMA BAUTISTA

CONSUL GENERAL- ISLAS
CANARIAS-ESPAÑA

FELIX BAUTISTA
DECRET.NO.306-09 DEL 22-04-2009/ HERMANA
DE FELIX BAUTISTA

49

TAMAYO JUAN SALVADOR TEJEDA
VENTURA

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

DECRET NO. 4-09/

84

BENCOSME/

COMISION PLD-NY

DECRET. NO 6-09 / COMISION

50

MARINO DEL ROSARIO GUERRERO

VICECONSUL EN AMSTERDAM,
HOLANDA

RAFAEL DANUBIO GARCIA

VICECONSUL EN ANSE A PITRE,
HAITI

PLD-NEW

YORK
DECRET. NO. 503-10 DEL 31-08-10/ FELIX

51

BAUTISTA
DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ADRIANO

52

NELSON MELITON PIMENTEL

VICECONSUL- EN ANTIGUA Y
BARBUDA

53

GUARIONEX SANCHEZ

VICECONSUL EN ARUBA

54

MILTON GERMAN HERRAND

VICECONSUL EN ATENAS-GRECIA

55

HECTOR PILARTE

VICECONSUL EN ATENAS-GRECIA

HERRERA/ COMISION PLD-NEW
YORK
DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK
DECRET. NO.193-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 4-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK

56

CAROLINA RODRIGUEZ DIAZ

VICECONSUL EN BARCELONA

DECRET NO. 662-08/ FELIX

BAUTISTA

DECRET. NO. 91-07/ TIENE

DECRET NO. 4-09 DE
EMBAJADA/NO HA TOMO P./COMISION
57

FRANCISCO TAVERAS GUZMAN

VICECONSUL EN BOSTON

PLD-NY
DECRET. NO.99-09 DEL 09-02-09/

FELIX

58

DOMINGA BERIGUETE

VICECONSUL- EN CABO HAITIANO

BAUTISTA

59

YORFI CRISTOBAL BENCOSME GRULLON

VICECONSUL- EN CABO HAITIANO

DECRET. NO.458 DEL 19-08-10 FELIX

60

JOSE MANUEL OVALLES MEJIA

VICECONSUL EN COLOMBIA

61

WELLINGTON GERMAN CASANOVA
CASTILLO

VICECONSUL EN CURAZAO

62

HECTOR HIDALGO

VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURTALEMANIA

85

BAUTISTA
DECRET. NO. 259-11 DEL 25-04-11/ FELIX
BAUTISTA
DECRETO NO.182-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 08-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION
PLD-NEW YORK

DECRET. NO. 06-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

63

CARLOS EUSEBIO MERCEDES

VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURTALEMANIA

JORGE ANT.GARCIA PAREDES

VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURTALEMANIA

SALVADOR A. PEREZ

VICECONSUL- EN HAMBURGOALEMANIA

VANTROI ILIENOV PEÑA

VICECONSUL EN ISLAS CANARIASESPAÑA

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO.182-09 DEL10-03-09/

64

COMISION

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

65

PLD-

NEW YORK
DECRETO NO. 306-09 DEL 22-04-09/ SOBRINO

66

FELIX BAUTISTA
DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

67

SALVADOR ORTIZ

VICECONSUL EN JAMAICA

ROBERTO MORENO

VICECONSUL EN MADRID-ESPAÑA

PLD-

NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 707-08 DEL 29-10-08 /

68

DE

FELIX

BAUTISTA
DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

69

HECTOR LOPEZ

VICECONSUL EN MEXICO

NEW YORK

70

RAMONA DELEIDY FELIZ FILPO

VICECONSUL EN MIAMI

DECRET. 662-08 DEL 21/10/08/ FELIX

PLD-

BAUTISTA

TIENE DECRET NO. 4-09
DE. EMBAJADA /NO TOMO P.
COMISION PLD-NY
DECRET. 1382-04, TIENE DECRET NO. 4-09
DE. EMBAJADA /NO TOMO P. .
COMISION PLD-NY
DECRET.1249-04,

71

GERMAN DE LEON RODRIGUEZ

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

72

PABLO GARCIA TEJADA

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

73

DIONICIO VENTURA

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

NEW YORK
DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

74

ERNESTO GONZALEZ

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

75

CECILIA SANTANA DE BAEZ

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

86

PLD-NEW YORK

PLD-

DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

76

DAVID CORDERO

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

77

VICTOR ACOSTA HIDALGO

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09 / /

78

VICTOR COMPRES

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09 /

79

FRANCISCO ROBLES

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

HILARIO TAVERAS

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

COMISION PLD-

NEW YORK
DECRET. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09 /

80

COMISION PLD-

NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09 /

81

JOSE FRANCISCO JIMENEZ REYES

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

BALTASAR FIGUEREO SIERRA

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

JOSE SANTANA

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

COMISION

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/

83

COMISION

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/

82

COMISION

COMISION

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

84

GREGORIO MALENA

85

GEOVANNY AUGUSTO RODRIGUEZ
MARTINEZ

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/

86

PEDRO P. ZORRILLA

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

COMISION

PLD-NEW YORK
DECRET. NO.131-09 DEL 19-02-09/ COMISION

87

CARMEN GERMOSEN FELIPE DE DEAN

VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK

PLD-NEW YORK
TRASLADADO ADMS. SAINT. MARTEEN OFIC. NO. 6071

88

SANDY JOSE TAVERAS

VICECONSUL EN PANAMA

89

HECTOR MAYOBANEX PEÑA B.

VICECONSUL EN PANAMA

87

DEL 04/08/09/ FELIX BAUTISTA
TRASLADADO ADMS. DESDE sUIZA OFIC. NO.20214 DEL
23-06-10/ FELIX

BAUTISTA

DECRET. NO. 147-11 DEL 15-03-11/ ESPOSO

90

KARINA (FELIX BAUTISTA)

CARLOS GONZALEZ

VICECONSUL EN PANAMA

COLOMBINA READ ROA

VICECONSUL EN PUERTO
PRINCIPE-HAITI

COMISION PLD-NEW YORK

92

EMILIANO PEREZ ESPINOSA

VICECONSUL EN PUERTO
PRINCIPE-HAITI

DECRET. NO. 240-10 /

93

MILEDIS MARTINEZ

VICECONSUL EN SAN JUAN-PTORICO

94

CARLOS MANUEL SANCHEZ ASENSIO

VICECONSUL EN SAN MARTEEN

95

GUILLERMO DE JESUS ANGELES

VICECONSUL EN SEVILLA

96

JUAN GUERRERO

VICECONSUL EN TOKYO-JAPON

97

ABRAHAM MEJIA

VICECONSUL EN VALENCIA

98

JUAN RAMON DURAN

VICECONSUL EN ZURICH-SUIZA

99

TERESITA PEÑA

VICECONSUL-MAYAGUEZ-PTO.RICO

100

ARISTIDES BAUTISTA

VICECONSUL-MAYAGUEZ-PTO.RICO

101

LUZ DEL CARMEN RAMOS PUJOLS

VICECONSUL-MAYAGUEZ-PTO.RICO

DECRET. NO. 537-08 DEL 12-09-08/SUEGRA DE CRISPIN/

91

88

/ FELIX BAUTISTA
DECRETO NO. 391-08 DEL 25/08/08 / SOBRINA
FELIX BAUTISTA
DECRET. NO. 147-11 DEL 15-03-2011/ FELIX
BAUTISTA
DECRET. NO.662-08 DEL 21-10-08/ FELIX
BAUTISTA
DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLDNEW YORK
DECRET NO. 662-08 DEL 21-10-08 (MILANO)/ FELIX
BAUTISTA
DECRETO NO. 707-08 DEL 29-10-08 / FELIX
BAUTISTA
DECRET NO.637-09 DEL 25-08-09/ FELIX
BAUTISTA
DECRETO NO. 391-08 DEL 25/08/08/ HERMANO
FELIX BAUTISTA
DECRETO NO. 710-08 DEL 29/10/08/ ARISTIDES
BAUTISTA-HERMANO FELIX
BAUTISTA

Appendix F: Official List of Staff from the Reformist Party (PRSC) in 2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014). Note: The Author of this
Research Only Removed the Diplomats ID Numbers and Photos.
DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETO
EMBAJADAS PRSC
NO.

NOMBRE

CARGO

PAIS

1

VIRGILIO ALVAREZ BONILLA

EMBAJADOR, DIRECTOR EJECUTIVO - COMISION Mixta BILATERAL
REP.DOM- PTO- RICO

2

FLORENTINO CARVAJAL SUERO

EMBAJADOR-COMISION Mixta BILATERAL REP.DOM- PTO- RICO

3

RICARDO ALBERTO ALMONTE ARIAS

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

CANADA

4

FRANCISCA MATILDE FRIAS VARGAS

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

ECUADOR

5

HERNANI ABRAHAM AQUINO HERNANDEZ

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

NICARAGUA

6

DIEGO VALLEJO RAMIREZ

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

NICARAGUA

7

VINICIO DE JESUS GRISANTY HERNANDEZ

MIINISTRO CONSEJERO

JAPON

8

IGNACIO GONZALEZ FRANCO

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

HONG KONG

9

ALFREDO GONZALEZ SEGURA

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

HONDURAS

10

ANTONIO VALENZUELA

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

HONDURAS

11

FERNANDO ANTONIO NUÑEZ

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

ECUADOR

12

GERARDO GUEMEZ MERCADO

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

COSTA RICA

13

RENE LEONIDAS DE LOS SANTOS CASTILLO

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

PANAMA

14

JOSE NICOLAS DIEGUEZ STEFAN

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

MISION ONU-SUIZA

15

MERCEDES GONZALEZ DECENA

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

PANAMA
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16

MIGUEL BOGAERT MARRA

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

PARAGUAY

17

JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ VELASQUEZ

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

PERU

18

AMADO JOSE RAFUL

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

HONG KONG

19

JORGE MANUEL DARGAM ESPAILLAT

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

PARAGUAY

20

DENNY SUAZO MESA

MINISTRA CONSEJERA

PARAGUAY

21

RAWEL DIOLVANNY MINAYA FIGUEROA

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

HOLANDA

22

GUSTAVO ADOLFO MARTINEZ BOGAERT

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

HOLANDA

23

GILBERTO VALDEZ

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

PARAGUAY

24

RAFAEL VASQUEZ

MINISTRO CONSEJERO Enc.Seccion Consular

RUSIA

25

AMERICO BOGAERT

MINISTRO CONSEJERO

INSPECCION

26

XIOMARA INMACULADA VALERIO DE NAZIR

CONSEJERA

PARAGUAY

27

HECTOR RAFAEL DE MARCHENA GONZALEZ

CONSEJERO

HOLANDA

28

CLAUDIO MANUEL ALBURQUERQUE CASTRO

CONSEJERO

TAIWAN

29

PELEGRIN ALFREDO CASTILLO ARISTY

CONSEJERO

ITALIA

30

DANTE ALFONSO MENDEZ

CONSEJERO

NICARAGUA

31

JOSEFINA ALTAGRACIA TEJADA

CONSEJERA

NICARAGUA

32

JUAN ALBERTO MERCADO

CONSEJERO

MISION ONU-NY

33

ANGEL SILVIO CAMPUSANO VASQUEZ

CONSEJERO

NICARAGUA

34

LEONARDO ANTONIO REMIGIO PICHARDO

CONSEJERO

ARGENTINA
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35

EYMI JIMENEZ HIROMITSU

CONSEJERA

ARGENTINA

36

WENDY GOICO

CONSEJERA

BELGICA

37

FRANCISCO J. ALVAREZ BRACHE

CONSEJERO

CANADA

38

JOVANNY ALMONTE DE LOS SANTOS

CONSEJERO

CANADA

39

ALBERTO J .BOGAERT. MOREL

CONSEJERO

CANADA

40

CAROLINA ESTHER HERRERA ALVARADO

CONSEJERO

CANADA

41

MARCOS ANTONIO DE JESUS ROSA

CONSEJERO

COLOMBIA

42

ERICK AUGUSTO BERNARD MATEO

CONSEJERO

ECUADOR

43

JOSE DE JESUS ALVAREZ

CONSEJERO

ESPAÑA

44

LUCY CAROLINA SANCHEZ GUERRERO

CONSEJERA

ESPAÑA

45

NELSON FORTUNA

CONSEJERO

WASHINGTON

46

LEON ARMANDO PATIÑO CACERES

CONSEJERO

OEA

47

MARINO EMILIO CACERES B.

CONSEJERO

MARRUECOS

48

EDUARDO CINTRON

CONSEJERO

EMIRATOS ARABES
UNIDOS, ABU DHABI

49

SILVIO DEMORIZI

CONSEJERO

GUATEMALA

50

GRETTER SOCIAS OGANDO

CONSEJERA

HAITI

51

JOHANNA MARITT HERNANDEZ SOLIS

CONSEJERA

HONDURAS

52

LEONORA ZACARIAS METZ

CONSEJERA

HONDURAS

53

MANUEL ALFARO RODRIGUEZ

CONSEJERO

INDIA
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54

MARCIA ARELIS VASQUEZ SOLANO

PRIMERA SECRETARIA

ISRAEL

55

DANI MARIELA JIMENEZ GENAO

PRIMERA SECRETARIA

MISION OEA

56

DAMARIS MISOLINA CANELA CORPORAN

PRIMERA SECRETARIA

MISION OEA

57

MARITZA CALDERON MATEO

PRIMER SECRETARIO

MISION ONU-NY

58

TOMAS HERNANDEZ LATORRE

PRIMER SECRETARIO

CHILE

59

JOSE FRANCISCO GERONIMO METIVIE

PRIMER SECRETARIO

PARAGUAY

60

ROBERTO VARGAS CORDERO

PRIMER SECRETARIO

HAITI

61

ANNA BELLE KOSZEWSKI CALCAGNO

PRIMERA SECRETARIA

RUSIA

62

ALEXANDER PEREZ CARRASCO

PRIMER SECRETARIO

WASHINGTON

63

FRANCES FLORENTINO LARA

PRIMERA SECRETARIA

RUSIA

64

ANNY PAOLA ALMONTE QUEZADA

PRIMER SECRETARIO

CANADA

65

SILVIA GONZALEZ SIERRA

PRIMERA SECRETARIA

NICARAGUA

66

FREDDY ORLANDO ROA TERRERO

PRIMER SECRETARIO

LONDRES

67

GREGORIO MEGDIEL POLANCO PEÑA

PRIMER SECRETARIO

LONDRES

68

FIOR D ALIZA CABRERA ROMERO

PRIMERA SECRETARIA

NICARAGUA

69

EUGENIO ANTONIO PEREZ PEREZ

SEGUNDO SECRETARIO

ECUADOR

70

VALERIO BELLO ROSARIO

SEGUNDO SECRETARIO

TAIWAN

71

PASCUAL BAEZ DIAZ

SEGUNDO SECRETARIO

HONDURAS

72

FELIX PEÑA

TERCER SECRETARIO

HONDURAS
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73

HECTOR JULIO FRIAS

TERCER SECRETARIO

WASHINGTON

74

SAMUEL NINA DOÑE

AGREGADO CULTURAL

CANADA

DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETO
CONSULADOS PRSC
NOMBRE

CARGO

PAIS

1

JOAQUIN BALAGUER,hijo

CONSUL GENERAL

NEW ORLEANS

2

ENRIQUE RICARDO PEYNADO

CONSUL GENERAL

HONDURAS

3

GUILLERMO J. ESTRELLA GABRIEL

CONSUL GENERAL

TORONTO

4

PRINCE ANTONIO NOGUERA GIL

VICECONSUL

ARUBA

5

DENISE BULOS BARCELO

VICECONSUL

BOSTON/WASGHINTON

6

MARCOS VINICIO PAREDES SALCEDO

VICE-CONSUL

CHICAGO

7

GERARDO RAFAEL DE JESUS MALKUM
PARADA

VICECONSUL

HAMBURGO

8

CLAUDIO MANUEL MARRA PEREZ

VICECONSUL

JAMAICA

9

CARMEN ROCIO PELLERANO NADAL

VICECONSUL

MIAMI

10

FEDERICO AUGUSTO ANTUN HERNANDEZ

VICECONSUL

NEW ORLEANS

11

RAUL ALBERTO NEGRON MORALES

VICECONSUL

NEW ORLEANS

12

CLAUDIO ERNESTO EUSEBIO
ALBURQUERQUE

VICECONSUL

NEW YORK

13

PAMELA MARRA M.

VICECONSUL

NEW YORK

14

PASCUAL RAMIREZ

VICECONSUL

NEW YORK
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15

CARLOS ANDRES LORA JAVIER

VICE-CONSUL

NEW YORK

16

OSIRIS MANUEL FERNANDEZ SOLANO

VICECONSUL

PANAMA

17

TOMAS EMILIO NUÑEZ CASTILLO

VICE-CONSUL

PANAMA

18

EDUARDO MORALES GOMEZ

VICECONSUL

MIAMI

19

NELSON BALCACER

VICECONSUL

PUERTO RICO

20

JORGE NOEL LOPEZ

VICE-CONSUL

SAN MARTEEN

21

MILAGROS HILARIO LIZ

VICECONSUL

COLOMBIA

22

GLORIA ALEXANDRA CARPIO GONZALEZ

AUXILIAR

MONTREAL

23

LEONARDO GIL

AUXILIAR

NEW YORK

24

SIRIACO CABRERA RODRIGUEZ

AUXILIAR

MADRID

25

CRISTINA NEGRON MORALES

AUXILIAR

CALIFORNIA

26

MYRNA GRULLON

AUXILIAR

MAYAGUEZ

27

TESS BEMPORAT PAIEWONSKY

AUXILIAR

MONTREAL

28

JONNY ALEJANDRO PEREZ LOPEZ

AUXILIAR

ANTIGUA Y BARBUDAS

29

LOURDESJASEL ARAMA VERGES PEREZ

AUXILIAR

HAMBURGO

30

CESAR AUGUSTO SANTAMARIA REYES

AUXILIAR

PANAMA

31

ALEXIS PEREZ CARRASCO

AUXILIAR

ESPAÑA

94

Appendix G: Official and Complete List of the Best Paid in the Dominican Foreign Affairs, Payroll 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do,
2014).

DESIGNACIONES POR
DECRETOS
EMBAJADAS
NOMBRES

RANGOS/CARGOS

DOTACION R.

ALEMANIA: BERLIN
1

RAFAEL CALVENTI

EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENC.

25,600.00

EMBAJADOR EXT. PLENIPOTENCIARIO

17,594.50

EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

25,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO SUST. A FEDERICO
CUELLO

31,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

27,800.00

EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

25,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENC.

30,000.00

ARGENTINA:--BUENO
AIRES
2

GUILLERMO PIÑA CONTRERAS

BRASIL:--BRASILIA
3

HECTOR DIONISIO PEREZ

BRUSELAS, BELGICA:
4

ALEJANDRO CESAR AUGUSTO GONZALEZ PONS

CANADA:--CANADA
5

JOSE DEL CARMEN UREÑA ALMONTE

CHILE:--SANTIAGO DE
CHILE
6

PABLO ARTURO MARIÑEZ ALVAREZ

COLOMBIA:--BOGOTA
7

HECTOR GALVAN SUZAÑA

COREA:---SEUL
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8

GRECIA PICHARDO

EMBAJADORA

33,737.00

EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLEN. /SUST A DANIEL GUERRERO

26,200.00

EMBAJADOR

18,700.00

EMBAJADOR

12,405.00

EMBAJADOR EXT Y PLENIPOT

40,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAODINARIO Y PLEN.

24,844.54

EMBAJADORA EXTRAORDINARIA Y PLENIPOTENCIARIA

27,000.00

EMBAJADORA EXTRAORDINARIA Y PLENIPOTENC.

32,000.00

EMBAJDOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

18,420.00

EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

30,000.00

CUBA:--HABANA
9

JOSE MANUEL CASTILLO

ECUADOR:--QUITO
10

VICTOR REYNALDO LORA DIAZ

EL SALVADOR:--SAN
SALVADOR
11

VICTOR MANUEL SANCHEZ PEÑA

ESPAÑA:--MADRID
12

CESAR A. MEDINA ABREU

ESTADOS UNIDOS DE
NORTE
AMERICA(WASHINGTON)
13

ANIBAL DE CASTRO

EGIPTO - CAIRO
14

MARIA GABRIELLA BONETTI ROSSELLINI

FRANCIA:--PARIS
15

LAURA FAXAS

GUATEMALA:--GUATEMALA
16

RENE BIENVENIDO SANTANA GONZALEZ

HAITI:--PUERTO PRINCIPE
17

RUBEN ARTURO SILIE VALDEZ

HONDURAS:--HONDURA
96

18

JOSE OSVALDO LEGER AQUINO

EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

16,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPONTEN

34,500.00

EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPONTEN

25,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

30,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

22,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

40,000.05

EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

30,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIP.

33,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAOR. Y PLENIP.

11,895.30

EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPONTECIARIO

22,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

25,000.00

EMB. EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIP.

28,000.00

INDIA
19

HANS DANNENBERG CASTELLANOS

ISRAEL:--ISRAEL
20

ALEXANDER DE LA ROSA

ITALIA:--ROMA
21

VINICIO TOBAL UREÑA

JAMAICA, Kington
22

JOSE TOMAS ARES GERMAN

JAPON:-TOKYO
23

PEDRO VERGES

LONDRES, INGLATERRA
24

FEDERICO ALBERTO CUELLO CAMILO

MARRUECOS
25

FRANCISCO A. CARABALLO

MEXICO:--MEXICO
26

FERNANDO PEREZ MEMEN

NICARAGUA: MANAGUA
27

LUIS JOSE GONZALEZ SANCHEZ

PANAMA:--PANAMA
28

OCTAVIO ALFREDO LEON LISTER HENRIQUEZ

PARAGUAY: PARAGUAY
29

MARINO BERIGUETE
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PERU:--LIMA
30

RAFAEL JULIAN CEDANO

EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPONT.

12,690.90

EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

18,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

38,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPONT.

30,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRA. Y PLENIP.

30,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRA. Y PLENIP.

24,391.00

EMBAJADORA EXTR Y PLENIPOTENCIARIA

26,500.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

30,000.00

EMBAJADORA EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

25,000.00

PORTUGAL:--LISBOA
31

JAIME DURAN HERNANDO

QATAR
32

HUGO GUILIANI CURY

REINO DE LOS PAISES
BAJOS (HOLANDA)
33

LUIS ARIAS NUÑEZ

RUSIA
34

JORGE LUIS PEREZ ALVARADO

SANTA SEDE: ITALIA-ROMA
35

VICTOR GRIMALDI

SUECIA:-ESTOCOLMO
36

MARINA ISABEL CACERES

SUDAFRICA
37

RAUL FERNANDO BARRIENTOS LARA

SUIZA:--SUIZA
38

TERESITA MIGDALIA TORRES GARCIA

TAIWAN --CHINA
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39

RAFAELA ALBURQUERQUE DE GONZALEZ

EMBAJADORA EXT. Y PLEN.

33,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

22,000.00

EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO

21,447.60

EMBAJADORA EXT. Y PLEN.

30,000.00

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO:
40

JOSE SERRULLE RAMIA

URUGUAY--MONTEVIDEO
41

DANIEL GUERRERO TAVERAS

VENEZUELA--CARACA
42

ADONAIDA MEDINA RODRIGUEZ

(SEDE: GINEBRA,SUIZA)
MISIONES PERMANENTES
EN ORGANISMOS
INTERNACIONALES
43

ROSA MARGARITA HERNANDEZ CAAMAÑO

REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTE ANTE LA UNESCO

32,000.00

MISION PERMANENTE
ANTE LA ONU:
NEW YORK
ORGANISMO DE LAS
NACIONES UNIDAS: (SEDE:
GINEBRA, SUIZA)
44

DR. HOMERO LUIS HERNANDEZ SANCHEZ

EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANTE P.

45

ANGIE SHAKIRA MARTINEZ TEJERA

EMBAJADORA ALTERNA

18,000.00

46

ELIO PACIFICO

EMBAJADOR ALTERNO

12,000.00

ONU- ANTE LA
ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL
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18,000.00

DEL COMERCIO (OMC):
(SEDE: GINEBRA, SUIZA)
47

LUIS MANUEL PIANTINI MUNNIGH

48
49

25,000.00

CLAUDIA HERNANDEZ BONA

EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANTE ANTE LA OMC
EMBAJADORA ALTERNA ANTE LA ORG. MUNDIAL DEL COMERCIO
(OMC)

EDWARD ANIBAL PEREZ REYES

EMBAJADOR ALTERNO ANTE LA OMC

10,000.00

MISION PERMANENTE
ANTE LA OEA:

WASHINGTON

50

ROBERTO BERNARDO SALADIN SELIN

EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANT PERM.

25,800.00

51

JIOVANNY F. RAMIREZ MARTINEZ

EMBAJADOR ALTERNO

10,000.00

52

RUDDY GUILLERMO SANTANA SILVESTRE

EMBAJADOR ALTERNO

10,000.00

53

VICTOR TIRADO

EMBAJADOR ALTERNO

7,500.00

MISION PERMANETE ANTE
LA FAO

SEDE ROMA - ITALIA

MARIO ARVELO CAAMAÑO

EMBAJADOR

26,580.00

54

13,900.00

VIENA, AUSTRIA
55

RAMON QUIÑONEZ

EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTE

26,580.00

56

MICHELLE COHEN

EMBAJADORA ALTERNA

13,900.00

57

ROXANNA ALTAGRACIA DE LOS SANTOS PIANTINI

EMBAJADORA ALTERNA

12,000.00

58

GILKA YVELISSE MELENDEZ FERNANDEZ

EMBAJADORA ALTERNA

13,000.00
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